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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Summary of the Problem
The primary job of the lawyer is to give the client access to the law in its
multitude of facets. The litigator provides access to the dispute resolution
mechanisms that are our civil and criminal courts and to the substantive law
that they apply; the "deal maker" provides access to the structuring aspects of
the law, regimes of contract, corporate law, securities, property, and trust; the
family law lawyer and the estate planner provide access to systems of law that
include both court resolution and structuring by legal mechanisms; and so on
with all sorts of law and lawyers. Each of these functions combines the
lawyer's knowledge of the law with the client's need for or ability to profit
from access to that law. This is true across the spectrum of law, whether
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procedural or substantive; whether concerning the mechanics and structures of
various legal devices such as contracts, deeds, and trusts, or the legal entities
that can be formed from combinations of such structures (a corporation or set
of corporations, for example, or a condominium, the limited partnership that
builds it, and the condominium association that will manage it).
The client often wants or needs to understand what the law is in order to
evaluate options and make decisions about his or her life, and the most
common function of lawyers (across specializations and areas of practice) is
to provide that knowledge. Knowledge of the law, however, is an instrument
that can be used to follow the law or to avoid it. Knowing that the speed limit
is fifty-five miles per hour on an isolated, rarely patrolled stretch of rural
highway will lead some to drive at or below fifty-five, but will lead others to
drive at sixty-three miles per hour or faster. Similarly, knowing that the only
penalty for engaging in unfair labor practices is back pay and reinstatement for
individual harmed employees can lead the employer/client either to avoid such
practices or to engage in them intentionally. Knowledge of the law thus is two-
edged. When the lawyer is in a situation in which the client may well use the
relevant knowledge of the law to violate the law or avoid its norms, what
ought the lawyer to do? That question is the subject of this Article.
Two brief examples will set the stage. The client is negotiating a multiyear
contract, anticipating that the first two or three years will be very profitable,
and the subsequent two or three years significantly less so. This client's
inquiries about the consequences of breach three years down the line and the
docket delays in the relevant courts lead the lawyer to believe the client is
considering breach of contract before he has entered into it. Or imagine the
client whose elderly wife or parent is desperately ill and in immense pain, with
no chance of recovery and no end in sight. The client wants legal advice about
the possibility of consensual euthanasia, and the lawyer is wondering whether,
in addition to informing the client that the substantive law would consider this
to be murder, she also ought to include advice about the possibility of
prosecutorial discretion or jury nullification. How ought these lawyers to
proceed? Should they provide accurate information about the law that may well
facilitate an intentional, planned breach of contract or a homicide? What
guidance-what rules or principles---ought the profession or the law provide
to lawyers in such situations?
Our legal system is premised on the assumption that law is intended to be
known or knowable, that law is in its nature public information. The "rule of
law" as we understand it requires promulgation.' (Consider for a moment the
alternative possibility of secret "law.") And one fundamental, well-understood
aspect of the lawyer's role is to be the conduit for that promulgation. In a
1. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-73 (1980); LOS L FULLER. THE
MORALITY OF LAW 49-51 (1964).
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complex legal environment much law cannot be known and acted upon, cannot
function as law, without lawyers to make it accessible to those for whom it is
relevant. Thus, in our society lawyers are necessary for much of our law to be
known, to be functional. The traditional understanding is that lawyers as
professionals act for the client's benefit in providing that access to the law.
Under this understanding, lawyers do not function as law enforcement officers
or as judges of their clients in providing knowledge of the law;2 the choices
to be made concern the client's life and affairs, and they are therefore
primarily the client's choices to make.3
The limits on the assistance lawyers may provide to their clients have
commonly been articulated and thought of as the "bounds of the law.''4 The
lawyer may not become an active participant in the client's unlawful activity,
and does not have immunity if she becomes an aider and abettor of unlawful
conduct. The difficulty arises in deciding whether providing accurate, truthful
information about the law-the core function of lawyering-can also be
considered active assistance in violation of the law in situations in which the
lawyer knows the information may well lead to or facilitate the client's
unlawful conduct. The answers or guides to that inquiry are disturbingly
unclear. There are no reported cases of civil or criminal liability on the part of
the lawyer, or of professional discipline, clearly based only upon providing the
client with accurate legal information.5 On the other hand, the legal limits are
not stated in a way to make it clear that providing such advice is within the
proper bounds of lawyering. Nor do these limits provide much assistance in
knowing when giving the advice is proper and when it is not.6 And while the
case law does not ground liability on such conduct, courts have rarely held or
clearly stated that such conduct does not provide a basis for liability. The case
law is for the most part silent. Does the client as citizen have an entitlement
to knowledge of the law? Or does the lawyer have an ethical or legal
obligation not to provide that knowledge when it may facilitate violation of the
law or its norms?
To begin, I set out several further situations to exemplify the problem and
show its range. I then consider, in Part I, a series of possible distinctions that
2. The familiar phrase "officer of the court" has little substance to it and provides few limits on the
traditional understanding that the lawyer primarily serves his or her client and not the system of law
enforcement, including the court. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 39 (1989).
3. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Trust and Distrust in Professional Ethics, in ETHICS, TRUST, AND TlE
PROFESSIONS 69 (Edmund D. Pellegrino et al. eds., 1991); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical
Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 614 [hereinafter
Pepper, Amoral Role].
4. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
5. See Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 287, 301-11 (1994)
(surveying cases).
6. See infra part I1. Some guides conclude that this advice is not proper under certain circumstances.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, I THE LAW OF LAWYERINO §§ 1.2:502, :506,
:508 (2d ed. Supp. 1994); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.3.2, at 694-95 (1986).
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might guide a lawyer, applying them to the original range of examples and to
additional situations. Although helpful in analysis, few of these lines appear
determinative, either alone or in combination. In Part III, I turn to the current
law of lawyers' ethics, which is somewhat helpful but does not appear to
provide clear answers to the problem. Finally, in Part IV, I consider the
possibility that the problem is so multifaceted and arises in so many varying
factual contexts that legal or ethical rules, principles, or guidelines are likely
to provide only partial help. The ethics of dialogue, character, and virtue as a
supplementary guide to these difficulties are therefore briefly considered.
The goal for this Article is twofold: (1) to provide guidance for lawyers
in working with their clients in these situations and (2) to explore some of the
difficult underlying questions of both law and lawyering entailed by the effort
to provide that guidance. The elaboration and exploration of the problem will
thus involve at least three dimensions: possible legal limits, possible ethical
guidance, and underlying jurisprudential questions. In searching for and
tentatively articulating possible limits and guides we become entwined in the
jurisprudence.
If, for example, we start with the assumption that a primary purpose of law
is to be known-and therefore that lawyers should start with at least a
presumption that they ought to inform the client of what the law is-then what
counts as "law" is important in determining what information the lawyer ought
to presume is appropriate to give to the client. The basic jurisprudential inquiry
of "what is law," what are its defining characteristics, thus takes on practical
import for the lawyer. While most jurisprudential inquiries have focused either
upon the role of the judge or on the citizen's obligation to obey the law,
surprisingly few have focused upon the lawyer. That shortcoming is an
important one, for the lawyer's role and perspective are quite different. While
we usually reflexively think of judges and legislators as those who make and
interpret law, and thus as the appropriate actors to focus upon regarding the
"what is law" inquiry, the significance of the issue we are addressing may well
be that it is lawyers-in giving legal advice and access to "the law"-who are
"making" and "interpreting" the law to an extent comparable to judges and
legislators.
The inquiry is broader than simply "what counts as law" (and is thus
presumptively permissible for the lawyer to communicate to the client),
however. It is also possible that different kinds of law, or different kinds of
potential client conduct, may well make a difference in the propriety of
conveying information about the law. Thus, a second key factor may be
whether the client's potential conduct that might be facilitated by knowledge
of the law is morally wrong, in addition to being unlawful; and, if so, to what
degree. Will it, for example, do significant harm to an innocent person? In
some ways this issue is connected to the kinds or classification of the law at
issue, but in some ways it is quite separate. Approaching the situation from a
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third angle, the likelihood that the lawyer's advice about the law will in fact
function as a cause of, or incitement to, unlawful conduct by the client also
appears directly relevant to whether or not the lawyer ought to convey the
information. These are the kinds of factors I consider in more detail in
Part II.
7
B. A Range of Examples
The lawyer is confronted with concrete situations, and to understand the
lawyer's awkward position it helps to approach the problem in context. I
present now a range of examples, starting with two extremes and then moving
to the large middle ground. We will return to these examples throughout the
remainder of this Article.
Breach of Contract. At one end of the continuum is advice about conduct
that most lawyers would not categorize as "unlawful," but to which the law
applies a sanction. Advice about breach of contract is the paradigm. The
dominant modern understanding of contract law is that one is free to breach
a contract, but may thereafter be required to pay compensatory damages.
Absent very unusual circumstances, there will be no punishment. Although it
is unclear whether the law regards intentional breach of contract as normatively
wrong, whether such conduct is "contrary to law," it is clear that the message
of the law is that breach of contract is not prohibited. Rather, it is conduct that
may entail a cost imposed by the law. Not only do lawyers feel free to give
this advice (which may well encourage or facilitate breach of contract), but it
would probably be malpractice to fail to give it when relevant to the client's
situation or to advise that breach of contract is prohibited by the law.
The Burdens of Civil Litigation. A closely connected example concerns
advice about the costs and delays involved in the law's procedures. In
counseling the client concerned about the legal consequences of a contemplated
breach of contract, should the lawyer inform the client about the substantial
burdens imposed upon the person who wants to collect compensatory damages
for breach of contract? Should the lawyer inform the client of the three-year
delay created by the current docket situation of the relevant court? Should the
lawyer inform the client of the evidentiary burdens (or problems) the plaintiff
may face in proving existence of the contract, breach, and damages? Should
7. Stephen McG. Bundy and Einer Elhauge analyze several of the questions explored here from the
rather different perspective of"rational actor modeling." Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge
About Legal Sanctions, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 261, 327 (1993). Their work is deployed at a more abstract and
theoretical level than this Article and focuses less specifically upon the role of lawyers giving legal advice.
See also Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision To Obtain Advice, Its Social
Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123 (1988), upon which the Bundy and
Elhauge piece is based. I discussed briefly several of the themes developed at greater length below in
Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 657,
668-73 [hereinafter Pepper, Rejoinder].
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the lawyer inform the client of the probability that these burdens will lead the
person to whom he is contractually obligated to accept a substantially
discounted amount to settle the claim rather than litigate? If the lawyer
concludes that this information will lead the client to breach the contract,
should the lawyer refrain from giving the information? Or is it malpractice to
fail to give it?
Criminal Conduct Involving Harm to Third Parties. At the other end of the
spectrum is legal advice the client may use for clearly criminal conduct
involving concrete harm to third parties. The classic example is the client who
asks which South American countries have no extradition treaty with the
United States covering armed robbery or murder."
Criminal Procedure. What do you advise the lawyer whose childless,
middle-aged, male client has just asked whether it is true that police and
judges in the community consider children under ten to be incompetent to
testify in sexual abuse cases? (Assume it is true.) A more timely example is
the defendant in a murder case being informed by the lawyer that the
maximum penalty for jury tampering is six months in prison and a S1000
fine. 9 Or imagine the client who consults the lawyer concerning the legality
of and penalties for euthanasia. If the facts in the euthanasia situation are
sufficiently sympathetic to make the advice relevant, may the lawyer inform
the client of the possibilities of prosecutorial discretion and jury nullification?
Examples from the Broad Middle Ground. Assume an Environmental
Protection Agency water pollution regulation, widely publicized to relevant
industries, prohibiting discharge of ammonia at amounts greater than .050
grams per liter of effluent. The client owns a rural plant that discharges
ammonia in its effluent, the removal of which would be very expensive. The
lawyer knows from informal sources that: (1) violations of .075 grams per liter
or less are ignored because of a limited enforcement budget; and (2) EPA
inspection in rural areas is rare, and in such areas enforcement officials usually
issue a warning prior to applying sanctions unless the violation is extreme
(more than 1.5 grams per liter).' ° Is it appropriate for the lawyer to educate
the client concerning these enforcement-related facts even though it may
motivate the client to violate the .050 gram limit?
A second, well-known example is the client who wants to file a tax return
reporting a favorable outcome based upon an arguable interpretation of the
law. The lawyer is confident the IRS would challenge the client's return if it
became aware of this interpretation and would be highly likely to succeed in
the event of litigation. If that were to occur, the penalties would likely be only
8. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' EThIiCS 143 (1990).
9. Laurie P. Cohen, Dirty Dozen? Tampering with Juries Appeals to Defendants Facing Steep
Sentences, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1995, at Al. Even if successful tampering can be proved. double jeopardy
protects the client from a subsequent murder conviction, Id.
10. Example adapted from Pepper, Amoral Role, supra note 3. at 627-28.
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the tax due plus interest. The lawyer knows that in the past the audit rate for
this type of return has been less than two percent, and knows that this fact is
likely to lead this client to take the dubious position on her return. Ought the
lawyer to communicate this information to the client?
C. Law and Lawyering: Predictions, Manipulation, and Norms
From the perspective of the dominant American understanding of
law-taught in the law schools and practiced in the law offices-the
enforcement-related facts in the last two examples would be considered part
of the "law," and thus appropriate information to convey to an interested client.
This is an instrumental view of the law, which casts its net wide in defining
"law" and in attempting to aid clients in their encounters with the law, whether
the law functions in the particular circumstance primarily to limit or to
empower the client. The American lawyer is likely to view law as a complex
process embedded in human interaction and taking place over time. Written
provisions, while an important part of law, are only a part. Human actors, from
the potential plaintiff in the contract action, through the budget makers who
limit the EPA's enforcement budget and the IRS' audit budget, to the
prosecutor and the judge, make decisions throughout the process that affect
clients as much as written provisions. Part of the lawyer's job is to take
account of and predict as well as possible the way both the written law and the
conduct of legal actors will impact on the client's situation.
Often called "legal realism," this view of the law is in fact an amalgam of
three major streams of American jurisprudence. First is the positivist
understanding of the separation of law and morality. The lawyer sees law more
as a set of facts concerning power and limitation than as a norm, an "is" at
least as much as an "ought." Second, and connected, this dominant view takes
from legal realism the idea that law is at least as much a prediction of what
officials with state power will do as it is verbal formulations that provide
objectively determinable limits on conduct. The third and most recent stream
is the process jurisprudence view, emphasizing law as an instrument of private
planning and structuring and deemphasizing law as limit, as adjudication, or
as prediction of the outcome of adjudication. While not denying conflict as
part of law, process jurisprudence focuses elsewhere, stressing creation within
the channels provided by "law" (including predictions of what both officials
and private parties will do). These three views are compatible in seeing law as
a complex factual matrix subject to both planning and manipulation. They are
mutually reinforcing in bringing to the foreground the instrumental possibilities
in law, while relegating to the background its function as a normative limit.
Similarly, they work together in emphasizing the open-textured nature of law
over its precision and its manipulability over its certainty.
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This "legal realist"" understanding of the law is combined in American
lawyering with the understanding that the primary job of the lawyer is to
provide access to the law in service to the client's needs, desires, and
interests.'2 From this perspective of service to the client, the dominant legal
realist view of the law is functional: it empowers the client and gives the client
the benefit of a sophisticated, realistic understanding of the processes of law.
But as the hypotheticals show, it is not a view without costs. Under this lens,
the law seems to transmute from a knowable limit to a rather amorphous thing
that is dependent upon the client's situation, goals, and risk preferences.' 3
If the law becomes generally perceived as merely indicating a potential
cost, a penalty that one is free to incur and to discount by the probability of
its enforcement, then structuring our common life together through law
becomes vastly more difficult and requires vastly more resources.'" For
example, consider the last two situations, environmental regulation and tax. To
the extent the client is led to perceive enforcement as a part of law, or, one
might say, led to reduce law to the probability of enforcement, the power and
effectiveness of the law as written, of the law as norm, has been reduced. Such
a conflation of law with enforcement may be the untoward result of legal
advice to the client under this "legal realist" view of the law. And the recently
dominant jurisprudential trend in the law schools-law and
economics-substantially reinforces this effect of legal realism by perceiving
11. I believe that the most common usage of the phrase "legal realism" by American lawyers and legal
academics incorporates and connotes all three of these streams.
12. How primary is in some dispute in academic circles and is unclear in the evolution of the etlucal
rules. The Model Code stated in part: "A lawyer shall not intentionally: (I) Fail to seek the lawful
objectives of his client through reasonably available means .... (3) Prejudice or damage his client dunng
the course of the professional relationship .... MODEL CODE. supra note 4. DR 7- 1 01 (A). Such general
"serve and do not harm the client" provisions do not appear in the successor ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which begins with the statement that "a lawyer is a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system, and a public citizen" and indicates no priority among those roles. MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. at 7 (1992) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. (Perhaps the closest the Model
Rules come to the quoted language from the Model Code is id. Rule 1.3 cmL) In some ways the new code
provides more substantial protection to the client, however, because it has simpler provisions that are easier
to enforce. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client."); td. Rule
1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.").
13. In previous articles, I suggested a moral justification for the lawyer's primary role as service to
the client and noted the problem created by the combination of that role with a "'legal realism"
understanding of the law. See Pepper, Amoral Role, supra note 3; Pepper. Rejoinder. supra note 7 The
observations in this Section are drawn from those works.
14. Bundy and Elhauge, with their focus on underdeterrence and overdeterrence. appear to assume
such a view of law. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 7. For an empirical study finding that people
perceive law in terms far richer than merely anticipated penalties or benefits, see Tom R. TYLER, WtiY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990), which concludes in part:
The key implication of the Chicago study is that normative issues matter. People obey the
law because they believe that it is proper to do so . . . . The image of the person resulting from
these findings is one of a person whose attitudes and behavior are influenced to an important
degree by social values about what is right and proper. This image differs strkingly from that
of the self-interest models which dominate current thinking in law ...
Id. at 178. For an exploration of the difference between law as sanction and law as price from a law-and-
economics perspective, see Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions. 84 COLUM. L REV. 1523 (1984).
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legal limits and rules as just another "cost," and clients as "profit maximizers,"
simply Holmes' "bad man"'15 dressed in modem clothes.
The lawyer giving legal advice to a client who may use that advice to
violate the law or its norms thus stands at an awkward moral focal point.
Under the traditional understanding, 6 she has not been delegated the legal
authority to judge or police her clients. To the contrary, her role has been
defined as serving her clients: to provide access to that public good that is the
law; to equalize power and opportunity by making available to all citizens
knowledge (and hence the power) of the law.' 7 But the modem lawyer's legal
realist (and law-and-economics) view of the law may lead the client to respect
the law less; to choose to violate the law and chance the consequences.
II. LEGAL ADVICE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW:
SOME GUIDING DISTINCTIONS
I present below a series of distinctions that might assist a lawyer in
deciding what information about the law to give to the client, and what not to
give. Three of those connect directly to the "what is law" question (Sections
A, C, and D). Two relate more to what kind of law is involved, exploring the
degree or kind of wrongfulness of the client's unlawful conduct as a possible
limit on lawyer assistance (Sections B and E). Finally, two distinctions relating
to the likelihood that accurate advice about the law will function as incitement
to unlawful conduct are considered as possible limits (Sections F and G)."8
A. Desuetude and Laws Rarely Enforced: The Law/No Law Distinction
From the perspective of law as prediction of what officials with state
power will do, legal provisions that have fallen into disuse are not law.
Although desuetude is not recognized as a defense to criminal prosecution in
this country, judges are not the only legal actors. Prosecutors and police are
legal actors with substantial legally authorized discretion. A consistent decision
over time not to enforce a particular legal provision looks a great deal like
lawmaking, in practice if not in form, in action if not on paper. It also may
have a significant relation to the law in form and on paper. The fact that
15. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
16. I refer to the tradition of the last 80 to 100 years. Thomas Shaffer argues that there is a quite
different preceding tradition. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41
VAND. L. REv. 697 (1988).
17. The equality part of this function is substantially undercut by the fact that access to lawyers (and
hence to law) is not free. Some critics point out that you can get as much justice under our system as you
can afford. For a brief discussion of this problem, see David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A
Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 637, 643-45; Pepper, Amoral Role, supra note
3, at 619-21; Pepper, Rejoinder, supra note 7, at 667-68; see also William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion
in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1092-96 (1988).
18. The chart in Part ll.H summarizes these distinctions.
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enforcement does not occur removes the occasion for courts to interpret, apply,
or otherwise deal with the legal provision and likewise removes occasions for
the legislature to take notice of the law, thus making it less likely that the
more traditionally recognized sources of law will modify or remove the
provision. Particularly in the legislature, this removal of the opportunity to
overcome inertia is a significant fact in determining the law as written. 9
On two dimensions desuetude thus constitutes a form of "law," or at least
approaches a kind of promulgation of "no longer law." First, it seems to a
sufficient degree to be the result of intentional decisions by authoritative legal
actors. Second, it suggests that other, more formal sources of law might no
longer support the provision if the choice were before them. To the extent this
is true, the conduct prohibited by the provision has moved from outside the
"bounds of the law" to within that limit, and therefore has become a proper
subject for legal advice from the lawyer even though it is advice from which
the conduct itself might ensue. Here the perspective of the lawyer giving legal
advice is extremely important. For the decision being made is not whether the
written law will be violated, but whether the client will be informed of its
desuetude and allowed to decide for himself whether this unenforced legal
provision binds him and whether to violate it. Thus the question becomes: Is
the decision as to whether this provision is still law to be an educated one
made by the citizen (client) in consultation with the lawyer, or is it one to be
made unilaterally by the lawyer?
Imagine a married couple residing together in a state where fornication is
a crime prohibited by valid legislation, but where the legal authorities do not
enforce this legislation. The couple is considering divorcing to gain tax
advantages they have heard about, but intend to continue living together
whether or not they remain formally married. The lawyer they have consulted
concerning their business and tax matters is aware of (1) significant tax and
other economic advantages that result if the couple is unmarried; (2) the
fornication statute; and (3) the desuetude of the statute.2, Should the lawyer
refrain from informing them of the laws resulting in economic benefit to
unmarried couples because this information is useless unless they violate the
fornication statute? Or should the lawyer tell them of these laws and benefits,
but also inform them of the fornication prohibition, and conclude that they
would therefore have to live apart if they chose to divorce to take advantage
of the benefits of the legal provisions? Would this last advice be providing
access to the law, or would it be deceiving the clients as to the "real" law?
19. Recently in Connecticut. unhappy spouses pressed for enforcement of the sa-'s generally
unenforced adultery statutes, and several arrests occurred. Attendant publicity led to the repeal of the
adultery provisions. Kirk Johnson, Bill To Void Adultery Laws To Go to Wetcker. N.Y. TsItEs. Apr. 4,
1991, at B7; No Adultery in Conn., NEWSDAY, Apr. 17, 1991. at 16.
20. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 330-31 (5th ed. 1991).
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Both the realist understanding of law and the quasi-legal effect of desuetude
suggest that such advice would be deception, and thus is not the advice a
lawyer should give. Rather, it seems appropriate for the lawyer to inform the
clients of all three aspects of the law and assist them in their decisions in
relation to that triangle of law.
That assistance-the lawyer's counseling function in relation to the client's
legally related decision making-ought to be rather elaborate in this kind of
situation because it may well lead to a violation of a still formally viable
criminal provision. The lawyer would need to explain the fact that the conduct
remains formally criminal and might result in criminal liability to the couple,
including the possibility that the desuetude might cease at any time: a policy
decision by the prosecutor, a change in prosecutor, or an arbitrary decision by
a single police officer could lead to a criminal conviction.21 What would be
lost in the event of a criminal charge or a criminal conviction would be
material, including the expense of representation in a criminal matter and the
possible stigma attached to a criminal charge or conviction. The penalty likely
to be exacted in the unlikely event of prosecution and conviction would
likewise be material, as would be the degree of unlikelihood of prosecution
and the reasons that might explain the lack of enforcement. Finally, the kind
and amount of financial benefit available from the unmarried status would be
crucial, for that is the motivation for the questionable conduct.
1. On the Obligation To Obey the Law, Paternalism, and Lawyer
Sophistication
Do such concrete factors exhaust the appropriate areas of legal counsel, or
is there more? The extent of the general obligation to obey "the law" seems
relevant to the client's choice. If it is, whether or not the fornication statute is
"law," or the "kind" of law there is such a general obligation to obey, also
appears relevant. If the lawyer is supposed to provide access to the law, and
if what is "really" the law is sufficiently problematic, then advice about such
abstract topics seems appropriate, albeit hard to imagine. The notion that
through a lawyer a client ought to have access to a sophisticated understanding
of the law leads to the conclusion that the lawyer ought to assist the client in
determining to what extent he or she feels obligated to obey law just because
it is law, and to what extent the fornication statute counts as law.22
21. Jamie G. Heller, Note, Legal Counseling in the Administrative State: How To Let the Client
Decide, 103 YALE L.J. 2503 (1994), begins with the report that Zo! Baird's "lawyer had advised that while
'civil penalties are technically applicable' for hiring illegal aliens 'no employer sanctions have ever been
applied as a result of the employment of undocumented domestic workers in Connecticut."' Id. at 2504
(citation omitted). While formal employer sanctions were not applied, Ms. Baird's violation of the
unenforced written provision resulted in her withdrawal as nominee for Attorney General.
22. Jamie Heller argues for just this kind of "full-picture" counseling, emphasizing that the lawyer
ought to educate the client about the applicable law's purposes as well as its letter, so that the client can
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Such counseling would require a fairly sophisticated and able client and
lawyer. And that thought may lead to at least three responses worth noting.
First, this conversation sounds more like what we might expect in a college
political science seminar than in a lawyer-client conversation. It simply goes
beyond the conventions that most clients and lawyers would expect, and thus
would be unlikely to occur; and, if it occurred, it would probably be
uncomfortable for both sides. Second, and related, lawyers in general may not
be particularly able or sophisticated in counseling about the nature of law and
legal obligation. Jurisprudence is not a required course in most American law
schools; desuetude is not something law students or lawyers are likely to have
focused upon. The third response is that this is all extremely time consuming,
and a significant proportion of less sophisticated clients will be unable to
benefit from this education even given a substantial counseling effort.
Moreover, many clients who might benefit would prefer not to; they are, in
fact, paying the lawyer to make this elaborate analysis for them so they won't
have to be bothered. 23 Thus both sides of the counseling dialogue imagined
above may be either less interested or less able than assumed.
To the extent the foregoing convinces you that the lawyer's counseling in
such a situation leads into a swamp, we may have come full circle. If such
counseling is impracticable, or not worth the effort, the lawyer must decide for
the client; the lawyer is forced to assume a paternalistic role.2' But in this
situation we still don't know what the lawyer ought to decide. Desuetude
means that "the law" is unclear. From the perspective of malpractice, advising
solely on the basis of the written law may be safest. But as noted above, it
also seems deceptive. Advising to enhance the clients' material interests-and
gaining the reputation of a lawyer who effectively does so-points toward
advising the client of the advantages of violating the unenforced written law.
make more fully informed choices. Id.
23. This perspective has been summarized by Chesterfield Smith. a former president of the Amencan
Bar Association:
Clients before long get great confidence in me and they don't want me to tell them all of the
alternatives. They want me to tell them what to do. I do it and charge them. [Laughter and
applause] I do say they have to develop a confidence that I have thought of all of those other
options and that I have rejected them myself. Once they have that confidence, they feel that I'm
wasting their time if I make them make any kind of choices.
Panel Discussion, A Gathering of Legal Scholars To Discuss "Professional Responsibility and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct", 35 U. MIAI L. REv. 639. 643 (1981).
24. Paternalism pervades the professions, but lies beyond the scope of this Article. It can be noted
briefly, however, that the premises of the lawyer role seem. at least in the first instance, inconststent with
lawyer paternalism. If the prime function of the lawyer is to provide access to the law. and if the purpose
of this function is serving the client, then the client's freedom to make his or her own decisions seems to
be at the base of the structure. I have articulated this in earlier work as serving the client's "autonomy."
Pepper, Amoral Role, supra note 3, at 616-18. To my surprise, some understand autonomy as necessarily
connoting isolation and atomism. My understanding of autonomy--the value of freedom and choice-is
entirely consistent with the values of connection and community. See Stephen L. Pepper. Autonomy.
Community, and Lawyers' Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 939 (1990) [hereinafter Pepper. Law.yers" Ethicsl.
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Neither paternalistic position seems clearly preferable to the swamp of honest
and full counseling.
2. Moving from Unenforced to Rarely Enforced Law
It is possible that, in our fornication statute situation above, the law has
been enforced on isolated occasions; for example, where the conduct was
flaunted before the prosecutor in a fashion extraordinarily difficult to ignore
(as in a "test case" scenario). Even where this has not occurred, the possibility
of its occurrence remains present, and the possibilities for the instant change
discussed above also remain present. Probability of enforcement is thus a
continuum, with desuetude occupying one of the extremes. Are rarely enforced
legal provisions sufficiently similar to desuetude to be assimilated for purposes
of delineating the ethical limits on legal advice? That is, if we have concluded
that full advice about the law in the desuetude situation is appropriate even
though it may lead to formally unlawful conduct, is the same conclusion
warranted in the case of rarely enforced law?
Consider, for example, the merchant who faces a Sunday closing law that
is sometimes, but rarely, enforced?5 Or imagine the trucker traveling through
a western state with a fifty-five-miles-per-hour posted speed limit, and
enforcement that occasionally, but only rarely, occurs between fifty-five and
sixty-five miles per hour. In these situations, it is much less clear that actors
with legal authority have made a consistent decision over time not to enforce,
and therefore more difficult to conclude that the pattern of nonenforcement
amounts to at least a kind of promulgation of "no longer law." The
assimilation should probably, therefore, move in the other direction: cases of
relatively rare enforcement should be approached under the more general
question of how the lawyer integrates law with predictions about enforcement
of law in giving legal advice. This distinction between law and its enforcement
is discussed in Section C.
Before moving on, however, it is worth noting that desuetude, or
something very much like it, may be involved in situations where one initially
sees only some disparity between the law as written and the law as enforced.
A case in point is the water pollution hypothetical above. We could perceive
or categorize that situation as partial desuetude: between .050 and .075 grams
per liter the law is consistently and uniformly unenforced.
25. See FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 143-44.
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B. The Distinction Between Law as "Cost" and Law as "Prohibition"
(the Criminal/Civil Line)
Legal provisions can convey at least three rather different messages. First,
the law can tell you that if you want to accomplish x, you will have to do a,
b, and c in certain prescribed ways. If you want to create a contract, you will
have to have an offer, an acceptance, and consideration. If you want to create
a corporation, the necessary actions are prescribed by statute. Second, the law
can indicate that some specific conduct will have certain prescribed negative
consequences; that some specific conduct creates liability for certain costs or
penalties. Failure to comply with a valid contractual obligation renders one
liable for some of the damages caused to the promisee and to a limited class
of third parties. A corporation that fails to conduct its business as required by
the state of incorporation, by not holding required annual meetings, for
example, may forfeit some of the benefits of being a corporation, such as
limited liability. Third, the law can indicate that certain conduct is prohibited
and will not be tolerated by society. A person who murders or steals will be
punished by being forcibly removed from society for some period of time, in
part to demonstrate how serious society is about the prohibition and in part to
prevent repetition of the violation. Legal provisions in the first two categories
indicate that some conduct is favored and some disfavored, and legal
consequences will reflect the differences, but the third category involves a
different and stronger message.
The ethical line for legal advice could be based on this distinction. Under
such a rule or guide, a lawyer could not give legal advice in a context in
which that advice is likely to lead to conduct prohibited by law, but such
advice could be given in a context in which it is likely to lead to conduct to
which the law only attaches a cost or penalty. The distinction between criminal
and civil law is traditionally understood as distinguishing the prohibited from
the tolerated, the prohibited from the "merely" wrongful.
1. The Ends of the Spectrum
The principal advantage of this distinction lies in its apparent congruence
with accepted legal culture and practice at both ends of the range of examples.
Holmes' "bad man" understanding of contract law has become so descriptively
accurate that few would contest the notion of a "right" to breach a contract,
26
and where a citizen has a right, it is difficult to envision a rule of lawyers'
26. At one point in time, the California Court of Appeals. in some limited circumstances, appeared
to be in the process of creating a tort of "intentional breach of contract" or "'intentional denial of the
existence of a contract." See Stephen B. Katz, Note, The California Tort of Bad Faith Breach. the Dissent
in Seaman's v. Standard Oil, and the Role of Punitive Damages in Contract Doctnne. 60 S. CAL L REv.
509 (1987); see also William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L REV. 1209. 1215-33 (1994).
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ethics that would prohibit a lawyer from informing the client of that right or
a malpractice rule that would allow a lawyer to choose to leave the client in
ignorance of a right she might profit from exercising. At the other end of the
spectrum, it is hard to countenance the notion that a citizen (client) has a
"right" to murder or steal, as long as she is willing to accept the law's penalty
if she is caught.27 The dominant legal rules and culture are certainly in accord
with this perception. Legal advice that facilitates such criminal conduct may
be prohibited by the current versions of lawyers' ethics,28 and the lawyer is
more likely to face tort liability for providing such legal advice than for
withholding it.
Even at the ends of the range the distinction is not without problems,
however. Breach of contract can cause serious harm, and our society (and
perhaps our law) perceive some level of normative obligation not to breach
contracts. It is not pleasant to contemplate a legal regime in which the primary
message of the law as transmitted through lawyers is that breaching contracts
is perfectly acceptable if it is to one's economic advantage to do so after
having calculated potential compensatory damages as a cost, discounted by the
probability and expense of enforcement by the promisee.29 This is perhaps
just another example of the two-edged nature of law with which we began: all
law, not just breach of contract, can be used to harm or to wrong. Here,
however, the law has specifically recognized the harm and the wrong and has
placed a cost or penalty on it. (Is it inaccurate to refer to the sanction as a
"penalty" because compensatory damages only include the cost of the damages
one's "wrong" has caused, and there is no additional sum whose only purpose
is to discourage the conduct? Note that torts are normally considered "wrongs,"
but are ordinarily "punished" only with "compensatory" damages.)
At the other end of the spectrum, the euthanasia example also gives pause.
Here we have contemplated murder, surely one of the core examples that
makes the criminal/civil distinction intuitively plausible, yet the notion that the
client has a "right" to know the law under which her behavior will be judged
and the procedures through which that law will be applied does not seem so
far-fetched. To prohibit the lawyer from giving the advice means that the
27. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
WIS. L. REV. 30, 48; see also Luban, supra note 17, at 647-48 (criticizing view of "Low Realism" that
law merely predicts what human officials do).
28. See infra part III. Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 7, at 323-27, provides a possible theoretical
justification for the current distinction, but it is expressly premised upon conditions that, as discussed Infra
part II.B.2, do not exist in the contemporary state of our law. To some extent Professors Bundy and
Elhauge recognize this problem, Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 7, at 326 & nn. 188-89, but they nonetheless
support the distinction in their conclusion, id. at 335.
29. The down side of this understanding of the obligation of contract has found colorful voice in
Connie Bruck's biography of Steve Ross, the creator of Time Warner. CONNIE BRUCK, MASTER OF THlE
GAME: STEVE ROSS AND THE CREATION OF TIME WARNER (1994). One of Ross' associates states, in regard
to business transactions with the Mafia, that "I'd rather make a deal with them than with regular
businessmen. With regular ones, a deal just means, whose lawyer can be cuter? But with them, a deal is
a deal. And if you break it, there's simple justice." Id. at 43.
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prosecutor has lawful discretion to apply the law to the facts in a fully
contextualized, nuanced fashion and to choose not to prosecute; the jury has
power to choose not to apply the law at all if it finds that the facts and justice
lead that way; but the lawyer must keep the client in ignorance of these aspects
of the legal system regardless of the specific facts of the situation.'
2. The Middle Range of the Spectrum
The intuitive appeal of the criminallcivil distinction as applied to limiting
lawyer advice about the law is substantially weaker when the examples come
from the middle range. In that category, I would include nonobvious or
nontraditional crimes, much regulatory law, and torts.
Indiscriminate usage of the criminal sanction creates a problem for
drawing our line between civil and criminal wrongs. To the extent that conduct
is criminalized when it is not intuitively obvious that the conduct involves a
serious moral wrong, the justification for the criminal/civil distinction becomes
obscure. The criminal sanction is supposed to announce that we are particularly
serious about a legal rule, that we really mean a particular act is prohibited.
But when applied to conduct that in no obvious way involves serious moral
wrongdoing, the question irresistibly pushes up: why are we so serious about
this? If no persuasive reason is available, we are reduced to the circular,
positivist, formal justification: because it's criminal.3
A few years after the national speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour was
imposed, the reason for the rule-conserving gasoline-no longer seemed to
be a strong national priority. Imagine the small trucker in a spacious, flat
western state who wants to reimburse his drivers for fines imposed for driving
between fifty-five and seventy miles per hour. He has asked his lawyer if it is
permissible to do so and if he could deduct such reimbursement as an expense
of the business. Or imagine a retailer just within the border of a state with a
Sunday closing law, in competition with stores just across the state line, who
asks his lawyer about the penalties for remaining open. The lawyer finds out
that the penalty is a criminal fine of only twenty-five dollars per Sunday. In
30. As to jury and prosecutor, see MORIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH. DiscRETION To
DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARMRES FROM LEGAL RULES 59-94 (1973) (suggcsting theory of
"recourse roles" that permit actors with role-authorized discretion to violate otherwise applicable rules).
Interestingly, the jury is instructed to apply the law as articulated by the judge, but there is no penalty for
failure to do so. In most jurisdictions, the lawyer may not inform the jury of this fact. Tis is one of the
relatively rare situations of intentionally "secret law" and is itself an example of the difficulty of knowing
what the law really is. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
31. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost. The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And
What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875. 1882 (1992) ("[Tihe central policy question on which
I wish to focus [is the following]: can a civil/criminal distinction be resurrected? Or should we accept the
two bodies of law as simply interchangeable means to the same ends?"); Henry M. Hart. Jr., The Aims of
the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401. 401-22 (1958). For a discussion of the increased role
of punitive civil sanctions, see Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Atddleground Between
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795. 1844-61 (1992).
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such situations, is the message sent by the law that the conduct is prohibited,
that it is disfavored and comes with a cost, or some mixture that is difficult to
interpret?
32
This problem is particularly pervasive in major areas of regulatory law
administered by agencies. Here much conduct is "prohibited" by law, but the
sanction can either be civil or criminal, at the discretion of the administrative
agency, and civil enforcement is the norm, with criminal enforcement
unusual.33 In our water pollution example, this would mean that the lawyer
does not even know which side of the criminal/civil line she is on until the
agency has chosen to act and draw that line in relation to the client's conduct.
A final problem with the criminal/civil line is contemplated tortious
conduct. Nineteenth-century tort opinions speak of negligent conduct not only
as wrongful in a strong normative sense, but also often as if it were forbidden.
The thrust of the shift in tort thinking over the last eighty years or so has been
to drain tort law of much of its normative content, to move away from a focus
on the "wrongfulness" of the conduct of defendant and plaintiff and toward
allocation of the costs of accidental injury on the bases of compensation, loss
spreading, and efficiency. Where the language of the courts once seemed to
assimilate tortious conduct to criminal conduct, the language of much torts
scholarship and at least some judicial opinions now seems to assimilate
tortious conduct to breach of contract. One is free to be negligent so long as
one is willing to pay compensatory damages to persons injured by that
negligence. Tort law is civil law. Tortious conduct is not prohibited, but it
may, after litigation, result in the imposition of an obligation to pay damages.
And thus it would seem that the client is free to commit torts, has a right to
commit torts (unless stopped by injunction), and the lawyer has an obligation
to educate him about all this if the circumstances make it relevant.
4
32. In each of these situations, the message may be further diluted by partial desuetude. In several
western states, it became common knowledge that enforcement of the speeding prohibition between 55 and
65 mph was extremely rare. And Monroe Freedman ends his Sunday closing example by hypothesizing that
the client opens on Sundays and is never prosecuted. MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 59 (1975).
33. A U.S. Attorney in the Department of Justice must agree to pursue criminal enforcement;
regulatory agency lawyers can secure civil enforcement on their own. To invoke the criminal sanction, "tax
fraud must compete with postal theft and water pollution for the U.S. Attorneys' attention." Franklin E.
Zimring, The Multiple Middlegrounds Between Civil and Criminal Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1901, 1905 (1992).
34. This is of course complicated by the possibility of punitive damages. By informing the client of
the law, the lawyer might supply the "willfulness" or knowledge element needed for the jury to find a basis
for awarding punitive damages. In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981),
evidence that Ford used a cost-benefit analysis in its design decision as to where to place the gas tank, and
in doing so placed a money valuation on human life, was the basis for a jury award of $125 million in
punitive damages (reduced by the trial judge to $3.5 million). Ironically, such a cost-benefit analysis is what
the Learned Hand formula indicates a potential defendant ought to consider in determining whether conduct
should be avoided because it imposes an "unreasonable risk," and is therefore negligent. And even if the
defendant makes an error in the calculation and the conduct is later held to be unreasonable, negligence
supports only compensatory, not punitive, damages. For a description of the facts evocative of why the jury
may have decided as it did in Grimshaw, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 206-13 (1988), and
sources cited therein. For a quite different view more focused on tort law and policy, see Gary T. Schwartz,
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Imagine: The owner of a small chain of run-down motels has discovered
that his twenty-year-old water heaters, all identical in make and model, are
starting to malfunction and release scalding hot water with no warning. There
is no way to know which one will go next. The owner does not have funds to
replace all the units, and he already carries so much debt that financing to
remedy the problem is unavailable. He has consulted his lawyer for legal
advice concerning his obligations. The severity and foreseeability of potential
injuries to guests using the showers probably make further use of the water
heaters negligent, but the probability of suit is unclear because neither the
injured party nor his or her lawyer will have reason to know of the pattern of
malfunction absent suit and discovery. Also, the client's liability insurance is
sufficient to cover likely compensatory damages. The lawyer knows that the
client is very attached to his business, and that he may have no realistic option
to avoid injuries except to close down-at least temporarily-and this is likely
to be fatal to the enterprise. The client is free to commit the tort-has a right
to commit the tort-and, under the criminal/civil dichotomy, the lawyer is free
(and possibly obligated 35) to give the advice likely to lead to that result.'
3. Counseling: Advice in Addition to the Law
It is important to note, somewhere along this path, that a lawyer is not
limited to giving only legal advice, or purely positivistic legal advice
unadulterated with other aspects of life. While the prime function of the lawyer
is to provide access to the law, there is no requirement that the lawyer be
legalistic in approaching clients or their situations. Lawyers can attempt to
open clients' perspectives, pointing out the value of ongoing contractual
relationships, or of a reputation for honoring one's obligations. A lawyer can
(and should) engage in what has been called a "moral dialogue" with clients
who are contemplating wrongful or harmful conduct. Lawyers who give advice
about the lawfulness of breach of contract probably ought to be obligated to
at least consider also giving advice that the conduct (1) is or may be morally
wrong, (2) may cause unjustifiable harm to specific persons, and even-given
The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 1013 (1991).
35. The Model Rules point both ways on this question. See infra part Ill.
36. This kind of situation is substantially complicated by the fact that when the lawyer is counseling
regarding possible future negligence, not only are punitive damages a possibility, see supra note 34. but
the client's awareness of the risk of future harm may also provide the mens tea element necessary for the
conduct to qualify as criminal. In the motel example, in addition to being tortious, the conduct might also
meet the requirements of reckless or negligent battery and reckless endangerment. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE
& AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.15(c) (1986); see. e.g.. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-204 (1990)
(assault in third degree); id. § 18-3-208 (reckless endangerment). The situation is analogous to the
regulatory area, where much conduct carries both civil and criminal penalties. The evidence that Ford used
a cost-benefit analysis with the Pinto gas tank, supra note 34, was the basis for an unsuccessful cnminal
prosecution of the Ford Motor Company. See Richard A. Epstein. Is Pinto a Cnminal7. 4 REGuLATION 15.
19 (1980).
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a perhaps unusual lawyer and client-(3) such conduct if followed generally
might be harmful to the fabric of society.
37
In the motel situation, for example, I suspect many readers will feel at
least some discomfort at the possibility that advice solely about the tort rules
will be perceived by the client as encouragement to save the business at the
cost of substantial risk of serious injury to innocent persons. That discomfort
leads to a desire for a fuller conversation: an exploration of the value of
continuing the business compared to the value of not injuring innocent
customers, plus an exploration of possible alternatives that might serve both
values (a little creative brainstorming).38 Dialogue along this line is one of the
substantial answers to the potential destructiveness of the combination of the
two-edged nature of law with the lawyer's obligation to provide access to the
law;39 it is one of the main sources of meaningful moral life for the lawyer
and meaningful moral connection between lawyer and client.
C. The Law/Enforcement Distinction
Is a distinction between law and enforcement of law the solution to the
problem of legal advice that may facilitate unlawful conduct? The lawyer's
obligation to provide access to the law could be considered to be fulfilled by
informing the client concerning substantive law. The line would then be drawn
at information about the various contingencies involved in the future
application of that substantive law to the client's facts: advice about the
enforcement rules or practices that might reveal to the authorities a violation
of the substantive law and the legal procedures through which any enforcement
or penalties would be applied would be out of bounds. The constraints that
channel application of the substance of the law to the client would be
information the lawyer could not convey to the client. To the extent the
problem is the perception of law as cost-the conflation of law with
enforcement-this seems the most direct answer for the lawyer giving advice.
37. Likewise, it would be a great disservice to the client contemplating consensual euthanasia to limit
the conversation to only legal advice, even if it is "full" advice including prosecutorial discretion and jury
nullification. This client's primary source of distress is not the law, and it may well be that the lawyer's
best service will be a full conversation exploring the possibility that an alternative to euthanasia is possible
and preferable. This possibility is explored further in Part IV (on the ethics of counseling and character).
Some of the reasons such conversations (particularly the third possibility in the text) are hard to imagine
are developed briefly in Part II.A.1.
38. We will return later to these possibilities in Part II.F and Part V. This discomfort might lead many
lawyers in the opposite direction from a fuller conversation, however. Unwilling to allow the possible
infliction of serious harm on innocent persons, and finding a basis for paternalism here that could not be
found in regard to the cohabitation situation, see infra part II.A.1, they might provide "preemptory" advice
that the client cannot continue using the water heaters (based on the fact that the conduct could be
considered criminal, see supra note 36). See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETICS IN THE PRACIMCH OF LAW
136-49 (1978).
39. See Pepper, Amoral Role, supra note 3, at 630-32; infra part IV.
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Imagine that lawyers have access to a bulletin board behind the counter at
the police station with a weekly list of the frequency of patrol of city
neighborhoods by day and time. The client, previously represented by a lawyer
on burglary charges, wants to know the frequency for Chez Ultra
neighborhood, Sunday, 2-4 a.m. Intuitively we know the lawyer ought not to
supply this information. The law/enforcement dichotomy provides an
explanation. The two-percent audit rate information in our tax return
hypothetical appears to be directly analogous under the law/enforcement
dichotomy, which would disallow this more generally accepted legal advice.
The distinction also provides a plausible answer to the water pollution
hypothetical, disallowing any advice beyond the written .050 gram per liter
limit.
The law/enforcement distinction is not consistent with the two possibilities
previously discussed. Desuetude is a matter of enforcement under this
dichotomy, and thus not something the lawyer could communicate to the client.
Likewise, the sanction for law violation, whether it be conceived as "cost" or
as "prohibition," falls on the "enforcement" side of the dichotomy and would
therefore be out of bounds for lawyer advice.' Distinguishing between "law"
and "enforcement," while intuitively attractive, thus presents significant
difficulties, several of which are canvassed below.
1. The Problem of Disentangling Civil Law from Enforcement
Imagine being asked to advise a client with a contract or tort problem, but
being unable to discuss the nature of the sanctions or the mechanisms of
enforcement for breach of contract or for tortious conduct. Could one
communicate to the client the nature of contract or tort without telling her how
they are enforced; without describing the nature of a civil lawsuit and civil
damages? What would the lawyer say? Could you tell the client that breach of
contract is "prohibited" by the law, or is "unlawful"? Could you characterize
tortious conduct as "prohibited" or "unlawful"? Or are those characterizations
sufficiently inaccurate that you would be misleading the client in giving such
advice? The distinction between civil and criminal law is fundamental, and to
a large extent it is a difference in the nature and mechanisms of enforcement.
If discussion of future consequences is out of bounds, it becomes truly difficult
to imagine the lawyer's discussion with the client in the area of civil law.
Return to the situation of the client who owns the run-down motels with
water heaters likely at some point in the future to seriously injure a customer.
40. In the three examples mentioned in the preceding paragraph. the reader may find the criminal/cvlv
distinction intuitively more attractive: It rules out advice in the police bullctin board situation, but might
allow it in the tax and water pollution situations. (Advice is allowable if the conduct is a civil violation
only and not also criminal.) That intuition, however, probably is based more upon the Malum in selmalum
prohibitun difference, discussed in Part II.E.. than on the criminal/civil distinction.
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If it is not criminal under these circumstances to proceed with business at the
motels, it would be misleading to tell the owner that the law "prohibits" further
use of the water heaters, or that further use is "illegal" or "unlawful." And
informing the client only that the conduct is "negligent" doesn't tell him much
if he hasn't been to law school. To communicate adequately to the client the
nature of liability for negligence will require the attorney to provide some
account of a civil lawsuit and civil damages. But once one is conveying the
nature of a civil lawsuit and civil damages, one has entered the area of
enforcement, and that is not acceptable under the guideline we are considering.
The situation becomes even clearer if we imagine giving advice about the
obligations of contract to one who is either contemplating entering a contract
or contemplating breach of an existing contract. To convey that breach of
contract is "prohibited" by the law (is "illegal" or "unlawful") is to suggest to
the client that society does not tolerate breach of contract. This would be very
misleading, however, because the regime of contract law clearly does tolerate
breach. (Some would argue that on occasion it encourages breach.41) The
message of contract law is nuanced, one might even say, conflicted.42
Perhaps the example of bankruptcy makes the point most forcefully. What
is bankruptcy law other than an elaborate set of procedures dealing with both
the enforcement and the extinguishment of debt? If discussion and explanation
of these procedures and their consequences is out of bounds for the lawyer,
bankruptcy law could not function as intended.
It seems, then, that disentangling civil law from enforcement simply is not
possible. That may be, of course, an underlying part of the fundamental
problem we are examining. But it also suggests the law/enforcement distinction
is not as useful for lawyers as it first appears. There are, however, three other
possible understandings of the distinction that might be useful.
2. Advice About Legal Procedures in Relation to Contemplated
Conduct as Opposed to Pending Litigation
Ethical Consideration 7-3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
distinguishes between the advocate role and the adviser role of the lawyer in
relation to "doubts as to the bounds of the law., 43 Because the advocate "for
the most part deals with past conduct and must take the facts as he finds
them," he should resolve doubts about the law in favor of his client." As an
adviser, however, the lawyer "primarily assists his client in determining the
41. See Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989); Ian R. Macneil,
Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982).
42. See generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988)
(analyzing conflict between ex ante precision and ex post fairness in rules of property and contract).
43. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, EC 7-3.
44. Id.
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course of future conduct," and therefore must assess "the bounds of the law"
in a more neutral fashion.45 This Article is concerned with the lawyer as
adviser, and with how advice about the law influences client behavior. Once
the client has acted, however, that concern is no longer relevant. Thus if the
law/enforcement distinction is to function at all there is at least one necessary
adjunct. The prohibition on advice about enforcement, at least as it is related
to civil and criminal procedure, would apply only in regard to advice about
contemplated conduct by the client that might entail a legal sanction, and not
to pending litigation that involves actions already performed. "6 Litigation is
enforcement, and once the client is involved in litigation, legal advice is
impossible if it does not deal with enforcement mechanisms and rules. If this
additional distinction were not applied, the role of the lawyer in litigation
would become totally paternalistic: the lawyer would make all decisions
because participation by the client would require educating the client about the
process, which would be prohibited. Such a nightmarish, Kafkaesque vision of
the client in litigation clarifies that during litigation, at least, advice about legal
procedures (enforcement) is not only entirely appropriate, but is a core function
of lawyering. The client is allowed to have a lawyer (in the criminal context,
there is a constitutional right to a lawyer) and the lawyer's primary loyalty is
to the client. This is the case precisely so that the party involved in litigation
will not be solely an object of the legal process, but will also have some
control over (and necessarily, therefore, some knowledge about) the process. 7
This distinction, in combination with the impossibility of disentangling
civil law from enforcement, 8 yields an additional possibility. Our spectrum
of examples begins with the effect on the client of learning about the limited
sanction for breach of contract, and then moves to the additional effect of
learning about the burdens of civil litigation entailed in enforcing that limited
sanction for breach of contract. As a refinement of the law/enforcement
dichotomy, one could educate the client about the nature of contract law but
refuse to disclose information about the process of enforcing civil damages.
Advice about civil procedure (and its attendant burdens and consequent
discounts) would be out of bounds until litigation was pending or
contemplated. Such a line might also function in the tort example of the motel
owner. The nature and function of tort damages might be explained, but not
the burdens imposed on potential plaintiffs by the discovery and litigation
process.
45. Id.
46. For an argument supporting a similar distinction, see Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavcll. Legal
Advice About Information To Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Destrabiltty. 0 HARe, L REV
565 (1989); see also Bundy & Elhauge. supra note 7, at 279-304 (summarizing and cntcizing Kaplow and
Shavell).
47. JACK L. SAMMONS, JR., LAWYER PROFESSIONAUSM 5-12, 55-56 (1988) (suggesting that primary
function of lawyer is to ensure meaningful client participation in resolution and prevention of disputes).
48. See supra part II.C.1.
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Two other, previously explored examples help to illustrate this possibility.
First, in the euthanasia situation, the substance of the law of murder (including
the grades and defenses) can be communicated without elaborating on criminal
procedure. The law/enforcement line as here modified would allow meaningful
legal advice about the contemplated conduct and the punishment for law
violation, but would rule out the whole area of advice dealing with how that
law would be enforced (including prosecutorial discretion and jury
nullification).
Second, application of this discrimination to bankruptcy is more difficult,
but still conceivable. Consider the person entering into substantial debt, or a
course of business involving constant, refinanced debt. Before the debt is
undertaken, the client can certainly be advised of the civil nature of the various
mechanisms for debt collection, and the various forms of security. But can the
client contemplating debt be instructed on the possibilities of bankruptcy? That
would seem to be advice about enforcement procedures (really, avoidance
procedures) in regard to contemplated conduct, and thus would fall on the
wrong side of this version of the law/enforcement line. The client already
legally obligated and in a position to consider bankruptcy (or the client who
is a creditor of such a person) could be told of the bankruptcy
alternative-which debts could and could not be discharged-but could not be
told of the elaborate procedures through which this would occur.
A large-scale Chapter 11 situation is more problematic under this
distinction. The large corporate client with either large products liability
exposure or an onerous labor contract might find a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
beneficial.49 But the outcome ("discharge") and the process in such large-
scale litigation in a relatively new area of law appear impossible to
disentangle. Advice about the nature and outcome of such a bankruptcy
without advice about the process would be so incomplete that it would
necessarily be misleading. The same is true with advice to any tort defendant
facing large-scale or mass liability: substance and process, legal "rights" and
their enforcement, cannot be separated without misleading the client.
3. "Enforcement" of Law: Discovery of Underlying Conduct or the
Procedures of Prosecution and Adjudication?
There is a clear distinction between two senses of "law enforcement." On
the one hand this phrase can refer to the process and procedures that will be
applied to determine the legal consequences of a particular set of facts. Thus
49. See generally Martha S. West, Life After Bildisco: Section 1113 and the Duty To Bargain In Good
Faith, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 65 (1986); Margaret I. Lyle, Note, Mass Tort Claims and the Corporate Torifeasor:
Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative Compensation Versus the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEX.
L. REV. 1297 (1983); Bamaby J. Feder, What A.H. Robins Has Wrought, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1987, at
CI; Safe Harbor of Chapter 11 Also Has Its Hidden Shoals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1987, at 2.
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the prosecutor's evaluation of a situation and consequent exercise of discretion
as to whether or not to prosecute is an act of law enforcement, as is the police
officer's decision as to whether or not to ticket a vehicle going four miles per
hour over the speed limit. Similarly, the standard of proof that will be required
to show future medical expenses or lost future income in a tort case is an
aspect of the enforcement of law between two private parties, as are rules
governing the number of persons who will serve on the jury and the rule as to
whether lawyers' fees are included in compensatory damages. All of criminal
and civil procedure are a part of law enforcement in this sense. On the other
hand, "law enforcement" can refer to the discovery of a particular set of facts,
which may then be subject to legal evaluation and process. The facts must be
known--discovered, gathered, and reported-before the prosecutor can
evaluate; the vehicle must be observed and its speed known before the police
officer can decide whether or not to ticket. The person who has been injured
by the tortious conduct of another must discover at least (1) the identity of the
person whose conduct caused the injury, and (2) that the conduct was tortious.
Advice from lawyer to client about "law enforcement" in the first sense
is intuitively far more palatable than is advice about law enforcement in the
second sense to any lawyer educated in the post-legal realist era. How one's
acts will be judged-the procedure of the law--does appear inextricably bound
up with the substance of the law. On the other hand, the likelihood that one's
conduct will become subject to legal evaluation appears much less a part of the
law, although it is certainly part of the administration of the law. Advice about
procedure (in the broad sense) may well be relevant to the client who intends
to obey the law; advice about discovery is more likely of concern to the client
who believes the conduct will be perceived as unlawful.
A possibly attractive alternative for giving content to a distinction between
law and enforcement of law for use in limiting advice from lawyer to client
is, therefore, to think of enforcement as discovery by government (or a
potential civil plaintiff) of the client's conduct, and to prohibit advice
concerning it. Under this alternative all other enforcement-related advice would
be allowed. This has the obvious attraction of the notion that lawyers will not
be in the business of assisting clients in hiding illegal conduct. For example,
this form of the prohibition clearly covers the information on the police
bulletin board about frequency of neighborhood patrol.
Unlike the previous two possibilities, one can imagine lawyers making
useful distinctions under the guidance of this alternative, and it thus offers
some promise. It would require, however, changes in currently accepted
practices. For example, it would appear to prohibit advice about audit
frequency in the tax context, advice that many tax practitioners give their
clients. And in the motel example, one of the factors mentioned was that the
probability of suit is unclear because neither the injured party nor his or her
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lawyer will have reason to know of the pattern of malfunction.50 This is the
sort of fact that most lawyers would assume is appropriate to convey to a
client. It relates, however, to discovery of a relevant aspect of the client's
conduct by the plaintiff, the analogue to police and prosecutor in the civil
context. Thus the criterion we are considering would prohibit the discussion
of this factor with the client. In the water pollution hypothetical, the distinction
cuts an interesting line. It rules out informing the client that EPA inspection
in rural areas is rare, but allows advising that violations of .075 grams per liter
or less are ignored. In sum, as applied to the police bulletin board and tax
audit situations, the alternative appears to yield sensible results; as applied to
the motel and water pollution situations, the sense of the distinction is less
apparent.
4. Intended and Unintended Lax Enforcement
The water pollution hypothetical raises another problem with distinguishing
between enforcement and law. It is possible that a disparity between a written
rule and the way it is enforced is intended government policy, and thus
amounts to a defacto amendment of the law by a governmental actor with the
power to make such a change. On the other hand, it is also possible that the
lax enforcement is not a matter of policy, but rather results from unintended
circumstances such as budget limits, incompetence, or happenstance.
Imagine two possible reasons why enforcement inspections might be rare
in rural areas. First, it might be that rural water tends to be significantly
cleaner than urban water (at least in regard to ammonia) and that pollution, if
it is occurring, is far less likely to be harmful in the rural environment than in
the urban environment. Multiple sites discharging the same pollutant are also
far less likely. These facts may have been known when discharge limits for the
particular effluent were promulgated, but more detailed regulation defining
"urban" as opposed to "rural" and articulating differential limits for the two
types of area, or otherwise more accurately calibrating the limit to the
environmental context, may not have been feasible. The agency thus may have
framed the limit with the most typical area and the most serious harms in
mind, with the intention of exercising regulatory discretion to fine tune the
regulation to different areas and conditions. The regulation was promulgated
with knowledge that it was intended more for urban areas than rural, and the
enforcement disparity known to the lawyer might well be part of the
regulator's policy. Alternatively, the .05 gram ammonia limit may be the
regulator's best judgment as to the amount sufficiently likely to cause
significant harm regardless of the presence of other effluents or multiple sites.
The less frequent testing in rural areas may be attributed solely to insufficient
50. See supra text following note 34.
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funds for enforcement, and the fact that it is less expensive to test in the urban
areas.
In the first situation, it is meaningful to say that the .05 limit is not
"really" the legal limit in rural areas. The source of law-the regulatory
agency-has intentionally made the law-as-enforced different from the law-as-
written for reasons related to its legal mission. (The situation is akin to the
desuetude example where prosecutors refuse to enforce an anachronistic
statute.) Since the harm the agency is to prevent is unlikely to occur in the
rural area, even over the .05 limit, the agency has tailored the law through
enforcement decisions. Such intentional use of enforcement policy for
substantive reasons appears to break down the "law/enforcement" distinction:
enforcement is part of the "real" law here. When, however, lax enforcement
is based simply upon cost, incompetence, or inadvertence, rather than
substantive reasons, the "law/enforcement" distinction retains meaningful
content.
5'
If the lawyer knows the reasons for a significant differential between the
law-as-written and the law-as-enforced, then the "law/enforcement" distinction
might be used in deciding what information to convey to the client. Frequently,
however, the lawyer does not know. Absent information, ought the lawyer to
assume that such a differential is not substantively based? Or, is it more likely
the case that in most such decisions substantive and cost factors are mixed in
a complicated way? Is it likely that enforcement policy is usually partly
law-that is, partly assessment of what is more and less important, more and
less wrongful, and so on-and partly "just" enforcement? If the latter is true,
the utility of the "law/enforcement" distinction is substantially diluted.
In sum, the distinction between law and enforcement has significant
intuitive attraction. A citizen's access to the law ought not mean access to the
means to evade the law; and distinguishing law from enforcement of the law
appears to speak to that difference. Our exploration of the possible ways of
framing and applying the distinction, however, reveals substantial difficulties.
The distinction will assist a lawyer's understanding of the situation, but these
difficulties render a thorough analysis complex and problematic.
51. It may often be even more complicated; budget constraints may well be the result of policy
choices: "[A]bsolutist statutory requirements generate overbroad regulatory schemes. . Since the
requisite tradeoffs have not been made at the legislative stage, they must be made in the enforcement
process, and the most basic and effective way of achieving this is through budgetary constraints. Michael
S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citizen Suirs Became an Entitlement
Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS. PRIVATE REWARDS 105. 116 (Michael S. Greve
& Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
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D. The Distinction Between Public Information and Private Information
Imagine, once again, that you are the lawyer anticipating counseling your
client concerning the ammonia effluent limits for her rural plant in the situation
where: (1) .05 grams per liter of effluent is the written limit, (2) .075 grams
per liter is the enforced limit, (3) inspection is infrequent in rural areas, and
(4) in such areas violators are issued a warning (given a second chance) prior
to any penalty. In deciding what information to convey to your client, ought
it to be relevant whether or not a given piece of information is generally
known to either lawyers giving advice regarding these matters or to the
industry in general? If, for example, items (2) and (3) are generally known
among lawyers for the industry, but you are the only nongovernment lawyer
who knows item (4), ought you to convey all the information except item
(4)?52 If so, we have yet another possible guide for what legal information to
give and what to withhold from the client who may use the information to
facilitate unlawful conduct.
Even though knowledge of items (2) and (3) may facilitate (or lead to)
unlawful conduct by the owner of the rural plant, withholding such information
might well put your client at a competitive disadvantage if the rest of the
industry has the information. And if the industry knows, then the government
must know that the industry knows, and continuation of the .075 gram limit
and infrequent rural inspections then takes on the characteristics of a conscious
"legal" decision by the agency, a policy it knows the regulated use as a guide.
In other words, if the lawmaker knows its conduct is known by and guiding
the regulated, that conduct looks and sounds like "law" to a contemporary
lawyer. It doesn't seem fair to put your client at a disadvantage in regard to
information available to her competitors, and part of why it doesn't seem fair
is that what the competitors have access to and are being guided by looks a lot
like "law."
On the other hand, if the industry does not know of the practice of giving
a warning, there appears to be less reason for your client to know; it doesn't
seem unfair for her not to know. Indeed, if the "second chance" practice is a
government decision, it would appear to be unfair for only your client, and not
the rest of the industry, to know. If it is a limit coming from the
government-that is, if it is law-it is wrong for information about the penalty
not to be publicly available. Thus, one distinction we could apply in limiting
information about the law that lawyers ought to give to clients is whether or
not the information is public. And this line dovetails with what we consider
52. As with the desuetude discussion above, there might well be many other factors the lawyer would
want to discuss in such a situation: the risk of violating a written rule and relying on an informal unwritten
practice, the harm (or absence thereof) caused by the anticipated level of pollutant discharge, and so on.
See supra part II.A.I, and discussion of counseling, infra part IV.
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law to be: rules and related conduct by the government intended to limit and
channel behavior.
If the "secret" rural "second chance" practice is not law, however, what
is it? It is certainly a line determining when a governmental actor with power
will act, and thus seems to meet the fundamental legal realist definition of law.
Meir Dan-Cohen has suggested that conceptually it is possible and legitimate
to have secret law, positing the possibility of different rules (1) to guide the
conduct of "the general public," and (2) to guide "officials" judging or
administering that same kind of conduct. He believes that such a distinction
clarifies several problematic areas of criminal law. 3 For example, the
criminal law might well allow the defense of duress only in cases where the
defendant was unlikely to know of the defense, thus minimizing the likelihood
of conscious reliance on the rule by a potential criminal. The rule known by
the public-or addressed to the public-would thus be a different rule than that
applied by the prosecutors and the courts. The public rule usefully maximizes
the deterrence of criminal conduct; the secret rule allows for greater fairness
in avoiding punishment for nonculpable conduct. (This might be the
justification for not informing the industry about the "second chance" policy.)
For such differentials to function, there must be what Professor Dan-Cohen
refers to as "acoustic separation": what the officials know, the public must not.
Under his analysis, the probable presence or absence of conditions that allow
for such "acoustic separation" will explain problematic distinctions in criminal
cases that are otherwise unjustifiable. Significantly for our exploration,
Professor Dan-Cohen assumes that information known by a lawyer will be
transferred to the client. If the situation is one in which it is foreseeable that
clients (potential criminals) will consult a lawyer, under this view it is an
inappropriate area for differential rules because communication with a lawyer
defeats acoustic separation.-
The law of conflicts of interest makes the same assumption as Professor
Dan-Cohen, that information helpful to a client will be conveyed to the client
or used on his behalf. A lawyer will be prohibited from representing a current
client against a past client if the two matters are "substantially related." 55 The
reason for this is that if the matters are so related, it is likely that the lawyer
53. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law.
97 HARV. L. REv. 625, 636-48 (1984).
54. Thus, in explaining a case in which the defense of duress was held not to excuse the violation of
the duty to testify, Professor Dan-Cohen notes:
The decision about whether to testify is of a distinctively legal character. it is a decision about
whether to participate in the legal process. It therefore focuses the individual's attenuon on the
relevant legal duty in a way that most offenses do not. The decision about whether to testify
is probably also the product of prolonged deliberation, in the course of which the individual
may seek legal advice about the scope of her duty and the likely consequences of a failure to
testify.
Id. at 642-43 (emphasis added).
55. WOLFRAM, supra note 6, § 7.4.1.
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learned confidential information in the prior representation that could benefit
the current client and correspondingly harm the past client. To protect the prior
client's confidences-and to prevent the lawyer from being tempted to violate
her obligation of confidentiality to that prior client-the law presumes such
confidences were passed and will disqualify or discipline the lawyer who takes
on such representation.
The same concern underlies the controversy over the "revolving door"
between governmental service and service to clients regulated by the
government. Lawyers gain familiarity with a body of regulatory law while
working for an agency and then move on to use that expertise on behalf of
clients regulated by the same agency, often in adversary proceedings against
the agency or in which the agency is the adjudicator. Rules analogous to the
"substantial relationship" test assume the lawyer will use information gained
in government service to benefit subsequent clients, and there is an effort to
distinguish situations in which confidential information is likely to be
known-and thus the lawyer ought to be disqualified-from those involving
only the kind of "general expertise" gained in government service that may be
used to benefit private clients.56
Note that these rules of conflict of interest support both sides of the
distinction we are considering. They affirm our underlying understanding (or
expectation) that lawyers will use all relevant information to help their clients.
On the other hand, in recognizing the confidentiality interests of former
government clients, they support the notion that some information about the
law57 ought not to be public, ought not to be available to future clients.
The public information/private information distinction would provide
guidance analogous to, but quite different from, the conflicts provisions. The
latter prevent information from being used to assist the subsequent client even
in completely lawful and proper conduct, while the public/private distinction
would be framed only to prohibit use of information about the law that would
facilitate unlawful conduct by the client. Also, the conflicts and confidentiality
rules only protect information acquired from a prior client, while the
public/private guide would focus not upon how or where the lawyer received
the information, but on whether it is generally known in the relevant client or
lawyer community.
56. See MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.11 & cmt.
57. It is conceivable that only factual information, legal strategy, and work product specifically related
to some particular incident or conduct (accident, transaction, course of conduct, and so on) are protected
by rules of confidentiality and conflicts, and not information concerning more general enforcement and
administrative policies and procedures. But this is unlikely. Internal governmental practices-not just facts
underlying any particular party's matter before a governmental entity-will often be at the core of
information the government wishes not to reveal. The current ABA Model Rules may be read to protect
only the former "factual information" in the conflicts provision, id., but the latter "governmental practices"
would appear to remain protected by the confidentiality provisions, see id. Rule 1.6 & cmt. para. 21
("Former Client").
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Such a line confirms and helps explain our intuition concerning the
behind-the-counter bulletin board in the police station with its information
about frequency of police patrols. The "behind-the-counter" aspect of the
bulletin board and the fact that it contains information useful to burglars both
suggest that the police have no intention of making this information public. To
the extent we can identify this aspect of information about enforcement as
"law," it is clearly the kind of law for which the lawmaker intends "acoustic
separation" to occur.
This public/private distinction also assists us in understanding tax lawyers'
willingness to inform clients of the two-percent audit rate under circumstances
in which that information may well facilitate unlawful underpayment of tax.
Once the audit rate information has been published (by the IRS or someone
else), it becomes public information about the way the law will be enforced.
As such, it seems unfair for some citizens to have access to it, and others not.
The IRS may not have wanted this information published and publicly
available, but once known it is hard to suppress. Sophisticated clients can find
it for themselves. As it is thus available to sophisticated parties (who can, in
essence, do their own lawyering), a tax lawyer is likely to see this as
information about the "law" that she is in the business of conveying to clients.
Tax practitioners have in fact assumed it is appropriate to convey this
information, and no legal constraint has been imposed (or, to my knowledge,
even considered) on them. On the other hand, if one lawyer happened to find
the audit guidelines inadvertently left in a conference room by an IRS
employee, most lawyers would consider the propriety of that lawyer using the
information for clients' benefit, passing it on to clients, or publishing it in an
article or service to be questionable. In such a context, the lawyer's conduct
approaches misappropriation of private information."
Although not likely to be precise, the public information/private
information distinction provides helpful guidance for lawyers. It connects with
both our notions of fairness concerning the government treating its citizen
equally and our understanding of law as public. It appears legitimate for much
information about the enforcement of law not to be available to the public. If
such information has been successfully kept from the public, the lawyer would
not have an obvious obligation to provide it to a client. The wide legal realist
understanding of law, however, would certainly define such information as
"law." Under that view, we have here a narrow category of justifiably secret
law.5 9
58. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Formal Op 382 (1994); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Formal Op. 368 (1992); I-pin' Bender, 10 ABAIBNA
Law. Manual on Prof. Conduct 333 (N.Y. 1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of Am. Bank. 10
ABA/BNA Law. Manual on Prof. Conduct 365 (,v.D. Mich. 1994). But see Aerojct Gen. Corp v
Transport Indem. Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr 2d 862 (Ct. App. 1993).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
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E. Differentiating Malum in Se from Malum Prohibitum
Intuitively we know that it is wrong to give the client information
available to the lawyer from the police bulletin board about the frequency of
police patrols in a particular neighborhood. That intuition explains, in part, the
attractiveness of distinguishing between law enforcement as discovery of the
client's possibly unlawful conduct and law enforcement as the procedures
following such discovery. The fact that this distinction would also prohibit
providing information about the frequency of tax audits in particular categories
of returns or information about the frequency of testing of rural water effluent
seems, however, to undermine significantly that intuition. What accounts for
the difference? The answer is that there is a clear and strong consensus that
burglary is wrong. On the other hand, whether or not it is wrong to discharge
.060 grams of ammonia per liter of water effluent in a rural area is a question
to which most of us would not have an immediate answer. For all we know,
such a discharge could be quite harmless; or, if kept up for a period of five
years, it may be likely to cause several additional cancer deaths in the next
forty years. Knowing that the discharge is unlawful adds relevant information,
and makes the conduct "wrongful" in at least one sense, but not on a parallel
with burglary. The discharge may be a technical legal violation, but it may not
be wrongful in any other significant sense. (It is quite possible, as noted above,
that the lack of enforcement resources devoted to discovery of violations in
rural areas is based upon the regulators' conclusion that the conduct is not
harmful to a significant degree.6°) The difference between burglary and this
instance of regulatory violation seems to be that the former is clearly wrong
in its very nature in addition to being unlawful, and the latter is unlawful, but
may or may not be otherwise wrongful.
That difference corresponds to the old distinction between crimes mala in
se, wrong in their very nature, and crimes mala prohibita, crimes wrong only
because prohibited by positive law. This distinction also helps in understanding
our intuitions concerning the criminal/civil dichotomy. The latter seemed to fit
in some circumstances, particularly at the ends of the spectrum. But it did not
do so well with regulatory criminal law, as in the water pollution example.6
A prohibition on giving the client legal information that might assist in the
commission of a crime rings the right chord when the conduct is something we
perceive as "really criminal," but strikes quite another note with vast areas of
regulatory law. The malum in selmalum prohibitum distinction appears, in
older garb, to formulate the difference between law as true prohibition (that is,
the identification of conduct not to be tolerated) and law as cost (that is, the
60. See supra part II.C.4.
61. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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identification of conduct to be penalized in some legal fashion, but which the
citizen is still free to choose to do).62
We have a strong sense that somehow lawyers' ethics must differentiate
these two. For example, William Simon notes that lawyers "insist that a person
has a 'right' to breach a contract," but "never argue that a person has a right
to commit murder so long as he does not leave behind proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of his act., 63 While the distinctions between criminal and
civil law and between law and enforcement of law do not provide the ordinary
practicing lawyer with an answer to Professor Simon, something like the
malum in selmalum prohibitum distinction does.
Lawyers' ethical rules have already used what appears to be this
distinction in one core provision. The ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility allows a lawyer to reveal "[t]he intention of his client to commit
a crime."'" In the current ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, this has
been narrowed to allow disclosure "to prevent the client from committing a
criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm."65 Although the organized bar may not have
articulated its reasons this way, I suspect that the large and amorphous
category of criminal conduct appeared to be too wide an exception to the
obligation to keep information learned from the client confidential, and I
surmise that no legal classification seemed to do the job better. So the
drafters66 appear to have been forced back upon an old distinction: if what the
client is going to do is really wrong, you can reveal it. But that way of putting
it is too vague-and too subject to individual interpretations of "really
62. For a brief discussion of this and related distinctions concerning lawyer assistance in illegal
conduct, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful
Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 669, 672-75 (1981). Professor Hazard relies primarily upon Restatements
and the Model Penal Code for his conclusions. For discussion of these sources, see infra notes 115-20 and
accompanying text; see also HAZARD, supra note 38. at 148.
63. Simon, supra note 27, at 48. Simon's point deals with the tension between the aims of substantive
law and those of procedural rights--between the needs for order and for discretion. David Luban has gone
further, arguing that "counseling an industrial client that antipollution standards are rarely enforced and
therefore need not be complied with is no different at all from counseling a client that the law against
murder need not be complied with if the client can avoid getting caught." Luban. supra note 17, at 647
For a response foreshadowing some of the observations developed more fully in this paper. see Pepper.
Rejoinder, supra note 7, at 668-73.
64. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR 4-101(C)(3).
65. MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.6(b)(1) (emphasis added). Many states retained the wider
Model Code language in their versions of Rule 1.6. See THoMAs D. MORGAN & RONA0LD D. ROTUNDA.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. AND OTHER
SELECTED STANDARDS INCLUDING CALIFORNIA RULES ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY app. at 132-40
(1995) (reprinting State-by-State Analysis of Ethics Rules on Client Confidences).
66. In this instance the language appears to have come from the American Bar Association House of
Delegates, which amended the Kutak Commission's "Proposed Final Draft." HAzARD & HODES. supra note
6, § 1.6:302. That draft did not have the "imminence" requirement. It did include "substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another," and rectifying client crime or fraud in which the lawyer's
services were used, in the short list of justifications for disclosure. Many states have adopted versions of
Rule 1.6 that include these added exceptions to the obligation of confidentiality. Id. § 1,6:109. nn.6--7;
MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 65, app. at 132-40.
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wrong"-to work well as a rule, so an operational definition was used: it is
"really wrong" if it is going to kill someone, or hurt someone in a significant,
physical way.
An attempt along these lines to translate the malum in se/malum
prohibitum distinction into guidance for practicing lawyers in giving legal
advice in situations where the client might use it for unlawful conduct could
take a narrower or broader form. A narrow rule could be framed to simply
track the one on confidentiality quoted above: when it appears likely that the
client will use knowledge of the law to facilitate unlawful conduct likely to
cause death or substantial bodily harm, the lawyer shall not provide that
knowledge. 67 Alternatively, a rule could be formulated to track the underlying
perception of the "wrong in itself' concept, and apply that concept to a larger
area of potential client conduct. Such a rule might state: when it appears more
probable than not that the client will use legal information or advice to
facilitate conduct that (1) is clearly prohibited by law and (2) involves what
is by clear societal consensus a serious and substantial moral wrong, the
lawyer shall not provide the client with the legal advice or information.
Such rules effectively accord with our intuitions in ruling out advice in the
most troubling situations. For example, the situation in which the childless,
middle-aged client is interested in whether legal authorities consider children
under ten years old competent to testify in sexual abuse cases easily fits within
the prohibition if there appears to be no legitimate basis for the client to be
interested in this information. The more general form of the rule also assists
us in understanding our hesitance to rule out advice about possible
prosecutorial discretion and jury nullification in the euthanasia hypothetical.
Although the contemplated euthanasia is clearly criminal, the client's particular
circumstances may make it unlikely that the conduct would be a "serious and
substantial wrong by clear societal consensus. 68
Thus, a rule constructed along these lines to reflect the difference between
malum in se and malum prohibitum could function to rule out advice from
lawyer to client in the most egregious situations. A rule of this kind would be
of value to practicing lawyers, reinforcing the intuition that certain advice
ought to be out of bounds, and announcing at least one category of
circumstances in which the client's right of access to the law is trumped by
67. A similar, but somewhat narrower rule is contained in the proposed American Lawyer's Code of
Conduct, a code drafted primarily by Monroe H. Freedman under the auspices of the Roscoe
Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation: "A lawyer shall not advise a client about the law when the
lawyer knows that the client is requesting the advice for an unlawful purpose likely to cause death or
serious physical injury to another person." AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1980). This
is narrower in that it requires a higher level of certainty on the part of the lawyer that the client will use
the information for an unlawful purpose ("when the lawyer knows" rather than "when it appears likely").
68. The ostensibly narrower rule, copied from the Model Rules confidentiality exception, is in this
example broader and less flexible. Euthanasia is a criminal act that will result in death, and thus the legal
information could not be conveyed.
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considerations that justify a refusal to allow the lawyer's knowledge to become
instrumental to a violation of the law.
Note here that the suggested rules focus upon the results of the particular
client conduct at issue, not on the classification of the legal violation or crime.
"Murder" is certainly a category of crime we would normally consider malum
in se. It is murder under the particular circumstances of the euthanasia example
that perhaps is not wrong in itself. And the ABA exception regarding
confidentiality refers not to the category of "crimes of violence," but to any
criminal act (including, conceivably, a violation of the water pollution
prohibition) "likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."
Such approaches move away from the old malum in selmalum prohibitum
distinction by moving away from legal categories, and looking more at the
particular conduct at issue. The larger categories seem too large to function
well for the basic right/wrong distinction we are considering.
Even having made this move, however, these possible rules are relatively
narrow. They function to give support and justification where the lawyer is
likely to know already, on one level or another, that under the circumstances
the advice is improper. They would not function, however, to give guidance
in the vast areas of legal advice that remain: contracts, much of torts, most
criminal violations that are "only" inala prohibita, regulatory law (substantial
parts of which include criminal penalties, but most of which would be
classified mala prohibita), civil procedure, and so on. Relatively little advice
in these areas of law would fall on the prohibited side of either of the two
rules articulated above.
It is possible that the basic perception underlying the distinction could be
extended to these less precise, more problematic areas. A flexible "standard"
might be constructed according to which each lawyer must judge under the
particular circumstances whether the client's prospective unlawful conduct is
"really wrongful" in some fundamental or serious way, or is "merely
penalized" in some legal fashion. Thus a client's intentional breach of contract
that was likely to bankrupt the business of an innocent, unsophisticated
individual might be treated quite differently from an intentional breach that
would cost a Fortune 500 company $100,000. The lawyer's decision to give
all the relevant legal information in the motel example would depend upon that
lawyer's categorization of the tortious conduct as "really wrongful" or as
"merely penalized" with the cost of damages. The absence of the clear societal
consensus that underlies the concepts of malum in se and malumi prohibitum
would mean that the guidance would be more subjective and contextually
determined, but it would still provide the lawyer with a framework for
considering the situation and making a decision. Because such a standard
would move away both from clear societal consensus and from somewhat more
objective lines, it might be that the direction given the lawyer would not be to
withhold the legal information. The lawyer might instead be required to
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provide the information only in tandem with the lawyer's assessment that the
conduct not only would be "unlawful" in some sense or other (breach of
contract, tortious), but also that it would be "really wrongful," and ought not
to occur.69
F. Who Initiated Discussion of the Possibly Illegal Conduct.
Lawyer or Client?
Many lawyers suggest that the ethical propriety of providing legal
information that may lead to conduct contrary to law depends, at least in part,
on whether or not the client has asked. Under this line of thought, if the client
has requested information about "the law" or legal consequences, the lawyer's
primary function is to provide that information. If, however, the client has not
asked, providing the information may well amount to the lawyer's suggesting
unlawful conduct, and thus would be improper.
Assume, for an initial example, that the client has suffered recent financial
difficulties, and current contractual obligations entail further serious financial
harm. The client has not, to the lawyer's knowledge, considered breaching
these contracts, although the lawyer believes the consequences of breach will
be significantly less deleterious to the client than will continuing to fulfill the
obligations. Is it wrong for the lawyer to inform the client of the legal
consequences likely to follow from breach, and of the lawyer's opinion that
these would leave the client in a better position? Is it wrong to fail to give
such advice? Is it malpractice?
Second, imagine that the client in our motel example assumes that because
the malfunctioning water heaters may do serious harm to a customer he has a
legal obligation to remove them, even though this is likely to lead to closure
and loss of the business, a possibility he finds very difficult to face. Ought the
lawyer educate the client concerning (1) the difference between the nature of
the obligations of criminal law and tort law, (2) the difficulties and
contingencies that an injured person would face in pursuing a claim (including
whether he happens to consult a lawyer and the difficulties of discovery and
trial), and (3) the significance of the client's liability insurance, including the
insurer's obligation to defend? (Ought the more creative lawyer raise in
addition the possibility of purchasing and installing the water heaters on credit,
almost certainly defaulting on the obligations, and then working toward an
extended payout with the creditors, knowing they would probably prefer such
a workout to taking either the heaters or the motel, which are security for the
debt? Is this advice merely anticipating the advice about breach of contract in
the previous paragraph, or has it crossed the line to suggesting a future fraud?
69. See infra part IV.
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Note that even if it is fraud, it appears to be a solution that prevents the
substantial possibility of serious physical injury to an innocent customer.)
Finally, consider the affluent client who owns four investment
condominiums, each with a federally insured mortgage, for whom it has
become uneconomical (but possible) to continue payments. The lawyer knows
that the client can walk away from the properties without paying anything
further as long as he defaults on only one of the mortgages in any two-month
period.71 Is it wrong for the lawyer to provide information to the client about
the government's enforcement policy, which is highly likely to lead to the
client's breaching the contract and to substantial loss for the government? Is
it malpractice to fail to give the advice? (Is it a form of fraud to "misuse" the
operational definition distinguishing "investors" from "ordinary owners" that
the government is attempting to draw with its enforcement policy?)7
Does it make a determinative difference, in each of these situations, that
the client has not asked? Two quite different basic perceptions about the role
of the lawyer point in different directions. First, for the lawyer to be the
originator of conduct contrary to law certainly doesn't sound right. Law, to a
large extent, is society's formal vehicle for channeling people into conduct the
polity has judged beneficial in some significant way, and away from conduct
it considers harmful or deleterious. For lawyers actively to counsel clients in
opposition to that channeling would appear to be plainly antisocial conduct, the
kind of conduct that earns lawyers the negative half of their image.'
The strength of this perception, however, is dependent on all the factors
discussed earlier in this Article: Is the legal provision really "law," or has it
been eroded by desuetude or enforcement policy into something society
appears not to be very concerned about? Is the conduct really prohibited, or
just freighted with a legal cost or penalty? Is the conduct really wrongful, or
just legally prohibited?
The second, quite different perception concerns the apparent unfairness of
advantaging the more legally sophisticated client over the less knowledgeable
client, or of advantaging the less scrupulous client over the more scrupulous
one. (I assume here that the less sophisticated or more scrupulous client is less
likely to initiate the problematic discussion with the lawyer.) The prime
function of lawyers-providing access to the law-suggests that it may not be
70. This informal enforcement practice was conveyed to one of my colleagues in a telephone
conversation with an official at one of the federal lending agencies, The practice was apparently intended
as a rough device for distinguishing ordinary homeowners from investors. Given the reasons for -acoustic
separation" with regard to such a practice, it seems curious that it was revealed to a private practicing
lawyer.
71. We may have a sort of continuum here regarding the lawyer's advice: inciting criminality - hard
ball ==- thorough competence ==. malpractice. We may know we don't want the two ends of the spectrum.
but how to identify them is less clear.
72. Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CA.. L
REv. 379, 389 (1987); see Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers. 68 B.U. L REV. I. 68-83
(1988) (presenting critiques and defenses of lawyers' ability to act independently).
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fair. Law is intended to be a public good; the prospect of differentially
available law is troubling.73 Lawyers function to make law available and thus
to equalize citizen access to one major public resource: use of the law.74 The
distinction considered here appears to subvert that positive role of lawyering.
The person wise enough to ask gains access to the law; the less knowledgeable
or curious or sophisticated client does not. Lawyers generally pride themselves
on understanding that the client may not be knowledgeable enough about the
law to know what he wants or needs. Frequently a lawyer must engage in
skillful interviewing in order to discover enough about her client to educate
him about where his situation and the law intersect. Lawyers often need to
counsel the client to understand what options the law presents. In this way the
sophisticated and unsophisticated are significantly equalized through the
assistance of lawyers.
Just as with the first perception, however, the problem of what counts as
"law" to which there should be equal access remains. We are cycled back to
the questions considered earlier. If we knew which kinds of law a client has
a "right" to violate and take the consequences, or under what circumstances
clients have such an option as part of the law, then we might know when the
lawyer could initiate discussion of such an option, and when it would, to the
contrary, not be a legal option for the client, and hence not appropriate for the
lawyer to raise. But such a taxonomy is not available to practicing lawyers.
G. Probability that Advice Will Result in Lawful Rather than
Unlawful Conduct
Can we provide guidance to the lawyer based upon the likelihood that the
client will use the lawyer's knowledge either to abide by legal norms or to
violate -them? To the extent the lawyer is unsure of the client's intention to
violate the law or legal norms, it is difficult to categorize providing
information about the law as assistance in unlawful conduct. Thus we could
create an initial legal guide that suggests that if the lawyer has no reason to
foresee that advice may be used to violate the law or a legal norm, she is free
to provide the advice. On the opposite side of this guide, we might frame a
rule prohibiting the provision of advice when the lawyer knows that the client
will use knowledge of the law to violate it.
An effort could be made to further refine such guidance; that is, to find the
line somewhere between these two extremes to determine when it is proper or
improper to provide the advice. A line oriented toward protecting society's
73. Promulgation is thought to be a requirement of the "rule of law." See sources cited supra note 1.
But cf discussion supra part H.D.
74. One should consider, to the contrary, William Simon's observation that because legal service will
always be a scarce resource, it is part of the lawyer's moral responsibility to decide which clients she will
serve. Simon, supra note 17, at 1092-96; see also Pepper, Amoral Role. supra note 3. at 619-21.
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interest in obedience to the law might provide that when there is a substantial
possibility that the information will facilitate violation of the law or legal
norms, the lawyer ought not provide the information.7 5 (A corollary might be
that in such a situation the lawyer may communicate further with the client to
learn more about the client's intentions or probable actions, 6 but could not
provide the information until he or she determined that it was highly unlikely
that the information would be used to facilitate conduct contrary to law or
legal norms.) A quite different, client-favorable line might say that the lawyer
may give such advice-that is, may give the benefit of the doubt to the
client-unless it is "very likely" that the client will use the information to
violate the law or legal norms. A number of other "in between" variations are
possible ("likely," instead of "very likely," for example). Or this approach
could operate more like a standard: the more likely it is that the information
will be used to violate the law or a legal norm the less appropriate it is for the
lawyer to provide it.
Two factors should be considered in relation to this possible approach to
limiting lawyers' advice. First, it is likely to be useful only in combination
with one or more of the other factors canvassed above. Aiding in a foreseeable
breach of contract may be perfectly acceptable whereas aiding in a foreseeable
homicide would not. Thus if the criminal/civil line were to be adopted as the
legal limit,77 the question would be how probable (or how foreseeable) the
client's possible criminal violation must be for the lawyer to be prohibited
from giving the legal information that could facilitate it, and what kind of
inquiry the lawyer would be required to make to clarify that probability. The
same question would need to be answered if the malun in selmalunz
prohibitum line were accepted as the appropriate guide. Whatever line
determined when the client ought not be given information about the law, one
would still need a supplementary guide concerning how likely the client's
wrongful (however defined) use of the law (however defined) would have to
be to trigger the prohibition.
Second, this probability or foreseeability guide often will become entwined
with the distinction discussed immediately above: who initiated consideration
75. A rule along such lines was proposed by the Kutak Commission in its discussion draft of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: "A lawyer shall not give advice which the lawyer can reasonably
foresee will: (1) be used by the client to further an illegal course of conduct ....- MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.3(a) (Discussion Draft 1980). The rule was rejected, and a quite different
rule adopted, discussed in Part III. "Reasonably foresee will" apparently is based upon the developed
notions of reasonable foreseeability in the law of negligence. "Reasonable foreseeability- in that body of
law indicates that something (the foreseen) might happen, however, not that it wil. Thus, the Kutak
Commission's combining of the two usages is obscure. It is unclear what level of likelihood would be
necessary to qualify as "reasonable foreseeability" that the client "wall" rather than "might" engage an
unlawful conduct.
76. See the illustrative case in HAZARD & HODES, supra note 6, § 1.2:506.
77. As it has been, in part. See MODEL RULES, supra note 12. Rule 1.2(d). discussed an Part Ill
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of the possibly legally wrongful conduct?78 This is because the lawyer's
discussion of the legal effect of possible future conduct may itself introduce
the possibility of that conduct to the client or otherwise substantially change
the likelihood of the client so conducting herself. The very possibility of such
conduct may not have occurred to the client because she did not understand its
legal significance. For example, education of the client concerning the .050
grams per liter ammonia effluent level and its nonenforcement below .075 may
substantially change the probability that the client will in the future discharge
more than .050 grams of ammonia per liter. A second example is the classic
Anatomy of a Murder situation in which education of the client concerning the
possibility of an insanity defense, and the implausibility of all other potential
defenses, substantially increases the likelihood that the client will lie to the
lawyer-and later the court-in order to create arguable "facts" to support such
a defense.79 In framing a rule or principle based upon some variation of the
probability that the client will use the information to assist legally wrongful
conduct, one must decide whether the standard refers to the probability before
or after communication of the legal information. Because our concern is with
the effect of information about the law on a client's conduct, it would seem
most sensible to focus on the likelihood of the conduct after the information
is conveyed rather than before.
A focus on the effect of the information, the before-and-after question,
could also lead one to suggest a more absolute limit: if conveying the
information makes it more likely the client will violate the law or legal norm
at issue, the lawyer ought not educate the client. Such a conclusion, however,
would either deny the significance of the issues considered to this point in the
Article, or it would send us back to them; back to ponder the client's "right"
to breach a contract, to commit a malum prohibitum crime, or to know how
the law in question is enforced.
H. Distinctions, Guidance, and Complexity
Having now canvassed seven distinctions, a number of permutations on
those distinctions, and some rules derived from them, all in an effort to find
some guidance for lawyers, where are we left? I would suggest that no single
factor provides clear answers, except for some situations at the margins. Clear
desuetude of a legal provision could be communicated to the client, for
example. For another, the lawyer ought not facilitate conduct that is clearly and
seriously malum in se by conveying knowledge about the law that will assist
the conduct.80 Aside from these important but marginal situations, the seven
78. See supra part II.F.
79. See ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958).
80. One of the two rules framed in Part II.E states:
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factors are not determinative-they do not provide us with rules or with
answers.
The civil/criminal line is the one most accepted and articulated by lawyers.
But that acceptance and articulation are not particularly deep or thought
through, as the water pollution and tax audit examples show. Each of these
presents a situation in which formally criminal conduct may well be facilitated,
yet most lawyers would think it appropriate to provide the client with
information about the law. For that reason, among others discussed above, the
criminal/civil distinction is not nearly as helpful as it first appears. The malum
in selmalum prohibitum distinction may well be the most helpful, but it has
several quite different formulations."' The combination of one or the other
form of the malum in selmalwn prohibitun distinction with the criminal/civil
line probably comes closest to the operational limit applied by most lawyers.
Although the conduct at issue in the water pollution and the tax audit examples
is possibly criminal, because it is not malurn in se, most lawyers would
provide the information. 2 And when both criminality and clear moral
wrongfulness are combined, most lawyers will hesitate and may well not
provide the facilitating information about the law. Unfortunately, the malum
in se characterization is itself both unclear and intimately connected to personal
morality, and thus subject to great dispute and difference of opinion. Any
combination of the two factors includes the weaknesses of both. Thus the
combination does not provide clear or rulelike guidance, although it is more
determinative and helpful than either distinction alone.
We can try to join the factors together-perhaps in a grid, as on the chart
on the following page-but this does not generate clarity either. Rather, it
provides us with a graphic demonstration of complexity: seven possible
distinctions, each of which, as discussed above, has significant problems and
variations within it. (An attempt at including those variations would make for
an even more bewildering chart.) The lawyer facing the kind of situation
explored here could, having considered each of the factors, place a check in
each appropriate box of the grid. The more checks on the left side of the grid,
the more concerned the lawyer ought to be about providing the client with
When it appears more probable than not that the client will use legal information or advice to
facilitate conduct which (1) is clearly prohibited by law and (2) involves what is by clear
societal consensus a serious and substantial moral wrong. the lawyer shall not provide the client
with the legal advice or information.
Something like this rule ought to guide the conduct of lawyers, and thus ought to be included in the Model
Rules.
81. See supra part II.E.
82. As noted in Part II.B.2, in the regulatory arena civil and criminal penalties are likely to overlap.
In the tax audit lottery situation, the penalties are more likely to be civil. The responsibilities of tax lawyers
in this type of situation have been the subject of much discussion. See. e.g.. ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985); BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN,
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (1985); George Cooper. The Avvidance Dynamic: A Tale
of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics, and Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1553 (1980); Michael C. Durst. The Tax
Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 1027 (1987).
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information about the law. Or the lawyer, as she goes through such a process,
might give a weight to each check mark (a number from 1 to 4, perhaps) based
upon the importance of each factor to the situation at issue. Attempting such
an exercise with one or two of the examples is surprisingly interesting. The
checks spread out in no clearly determinative pattern (usually a significant
number on each side), but the process of deciding which side the check goes
on, and how important that factor ought to be, is clearly helpful even though
it provides no direct answer.
Criminal Violation Civil Violation
(Law as prohibition) (Law as cost)
Conduct Malum in Se Conduct Malum Prohibitum
(Conduct wrong in itself) (Conduct "merely" prohibited)
Enforced Law Rarely Enforced Law Unenforced Law
Enforcement of Law Procedural Law Substantive Legal
Rules
Private Information Public Information
Lawyer-Initiated Discussion Client-Initiated Discussion
Likely information will be used to Unlikely information will be used to
assist unlawful conduct assist unlawful conduct
FIGURE 1. Distinctions Discussed in Part II
This suggests, in turn, that the value of the factors-or of the grid-is
primarily in providing a process to help analyze problem situations. The
distinctions draw the lawyer's attention to a number of different perspectives
from which a particular situation can be seen, and allow for separate
consideration of each. The process thus helps discipline a lawyer's
consideration of the situation, providing a mechanism for initiating and refining
the lawyer's intuition. Given the complexity and the lack of determinative
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guides, refined and reflective intuition may be the most one can seek. One
aspect of the situation, one factor in the grid, will just seem more important.
Often it will be the malum in selmalum prohibitum distinction: is there
something fundamentally wrong with the conduct the lawyer may be assisting?
Or it may seem that the advice is not really about "law," but is really about the
enforcement of law and how to avoid it. And while the sense that one factor
in the particular situation is more significant-that the conduct is really wrong
(or not), or the advice is about avoiding detection rather than about more
central aspects of "law"-leaves us relying essentially on the lawyer's
intuition, it is at least an intuition that has been forced to consider the situation
from the vantage of a number of possible distinguishing factors, a number of
possibly significant perspectives. Thus, the explorations to this point are
substantially useful, although far from providing lawyers with a rule or set of
rules to use when confronted with the problem. What follows in Part III is a
brief exploration of the law to determine if it provides greater clarity of
direction or guidance.
Before moving to the law, however, it should be noted that the questions
we have been exploring could be consolidated and seen as aspects of three
more inclusive questions. First, does the conduct of the client that may be
facilitated involve real wrongfulness? The first two lines on the chart (the
criminal/civil and malum in se/nalumn prohibitin distinctions) deal with that
question. Second, is the advice or information to be conveyed about "law"?
The middle three lines on the chart (dealing with the knot of issues connected
to enforcement of law and with the distinction between private information and
public information) are facets of that fundamental jurisprudential question,
what is law? Third, will the advice or information incite the client to engage
in the conduct? The bottom two lines on the chart (dealing with initiation of
the subject and likelihood of the client acting unlawfully) relate to that final
factor. My own sense is that such a consolidation masks more than it reveals,
however. Each of the seven distinctions concerns a quite separate issue. For
this reason, Part II of this Article has explored the issues from each of these
distinct perspectives.
III. THE LAW
The law intended to govern and guide the conduct of lawyers addresses
our subject quite directly. Rule 1.2(d) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct states: "A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with
a client ... If one assumes that "getting caught" and "getting punished"
83. MODEL RuLES, supra note 12, Rule 1.2(d).
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are "legal consequences," this rule allows a lawyer to provide a client with
correct information about the law in all of the situations we have considered.
The exploration in Part II shows that legal practice currently assumes
consequences of this sort to be relevant information about the law in many
substantive areas (for example, the labor law, contract, tort, and water pollution
situations), and shows further that there are no obviously correct lines to
separate some such advice as out of bounds.
The line drawn in Rule 1.2(d) is between directing, suggesting, or assisting
in criminal or fraudulent conduct, on the one hand, and providing information
about the law ("legal consequences") on the other. As the situations canvassed
above show, however, it is frequently the case that educating the client about
the law may function as the equivalent of suggesting or assisting in its
violation. It is therefore important to note that the explicit phrasing of the rule
appears to deal with this overlap directly and clearly by indicating that
communicating "the law" is always acceptable, and by itself is not to be
considered suggestion or assistance. A paraphrase would be: You may not
suggest or assist, "but'"-regardless of that prohibition-you "may" inform a
client what the law is regarding "any" course of conduct. 4 In other words,
"discuss[ing] the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct" is
permissible even if that discussion has the effect of counseling or assisting in
criminal or fraudulent conduct. The rule so read sanctions providing the
information across the spectrum of examples provided in Part I, including the
extradition, jury tampering, and child testimony information examples.
Significantly, the rule's phrasing also appears to clarify that the client may be
informed about enforcement of the law: "Law" is not the operative language;
"legal consequences" are what the lawyer is permitted to communicate
regarding "any proposed course of conduct."'"
The Comment to Rule 1.2(d) does not recognize that this line is as bright
as the clear black-letter language indicates. Paragraph 7 of the Comment states
in part that "the lawyer is required to avoid furthering the [criminal or
fraudulent] purpose, for example, by suggesting how it might be concealed. 86
If, however, that information is part of a "discussion" of the "legal
consequences" of the concealing activities, then the "but a lawyer may discuss
84. That this is the intention of the rule as drafted is reinforced by the rejected predecessor of this rule
from the Discussion Draft of the Rules: "A lawyer shall not give advice which the lawyer can reasonably
foresee will: (1) be used by the client to further an illegal course of conduct .... MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.3(a) (Discussion Draft 1980). This rule handles the overlap between
providing accurate legal information and suggesting unlawful conduct quite differently than the language
ultimately adopted.
85. Going one further step down this path, the rule also appears to allow advice about the police
bulletin board, see supra part I.C., because apprehension by a police patrol would seem to be a "legal
consequence." It is possible, of course, that the rule may be interpreted to exclude discovery of client
conduct from the category of "legal consequences," but this would entail the difficulties mentioned in Part
II.C.3.
86. MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.2(d) cmt. para. 7.
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the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct" language of the
black letter appears to be contrary to the Comment."' Paragraph 6 of the
Comments to Rule 1.2, although not exactly contrary to the rule, elides the
issue, stating in part: "There is a critical distinction between presenting an
analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means
by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.' 'n Here again,
however, the black letter clearly indicates that overlaps of this "critical
distinction" (discussion of information that could be considered to be both) are
ruled by the exception; they are to be considered "analysis of legal aspects."' 9
On first glance, the provision thus embodies the conclusion that a citizen
(the client) has a right to know the law, and therefore a lawyer may not be
prohibited from providing truthful information about the law (including
enforcement, which would seem to be part of the "legal consequences" of
conduct). "Law is public information" appears to be the premise. Interestingly,
this is not quite the rule, because the lawyer is not required to provide the
client with information about the law. The lawyer is permitted-not
required-to "discuss the legal consequences" with the client, and thus it
appears that the lawyer has the "right" to inform the client, not that the client
has the "right" to know. The purpose of the rule might therefore be simply to
protect lawyers in this difficult area. A more palatable alternative
understanding of the premise underlying the rule would be that these questions
are simply too various and difficult for a rule, and are thus best left to lawyer
discretion (a conclusion that I explore at greater length in Part IV).
It is also possible, however, that rules other than 1.2(d) require the lawyer
to provide relevant information about the law and legal consequences; other
provisions may embody, to some extent, the client's "right" to know "the law"
87. Id. Rule 1.2(d) (emphasis added). This is not the only, or the most blatant, conflict between the
black letter and the Comments in the Model Rules. Compare, for example, the black letter of Model Rule
3.2 and the final sentence of the Comment for that rule. It is clear that in cases of conflict, the text of a
rule is intended to govern over a Comment. The "Scope" provision prior to the Rules states in part: "The
Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative." Id. Scope
para. 9. "Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance
with the Rules." Id. para. I.
88. Id. Rule 1.2 cmt. para. 6.
89. Professor Wolfram acknowledges the bright-line distinction made in the text of the rule, but asserts
that "[s]uch a profoundly disturbing reading of Rule 1.2(d) would obviously be resisted by any body
presented with the issue." WOLFRAM, supra note 6. at 694-95. Given the dearth of authority regarding
sanctioning a lawyer on the basis of such conduct only, see infra notes 109-20 and accompanying text, this
is a curious assertion.
Professors Bundy and Elhauge resist the clear interpretation of the rule suggested in the text. relying
on the "critical distinction" sentence quoted from paragraph 6 of the Comment to conclude that "advice
that the conduct is unlawful is clearly permitted, but other types of advice are shadowed by uncrtainty
concerning the boundary between permitted analysis and prohibited assistance." Bundy & Elhauge, supra
note 7, at 324.
Professor Newman recognizes the clear distinction made by the rule. He assumes that the lawyer will
be directing the client's conduct, and therefore sees in the rule an emphasis on which of two forms the
lawyer's language can take: the "command form" or the "discussing the consequences" form. Newman.
supra note 5, at 290-92.
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governing her. Rule 1.4(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation." 90 Rule 2.1 states that "a lawyer shall ... render
candid advice."'" Rule 1.2(a) provides that a lawyer "shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation, . . . and shall consult
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued."' A portion
of the Comment to 1.2(d) asserts simply: "A lawyer is required to give an
honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from
a client's conduct." 93 And the primary rule, 1.1, requires that the lawyer
"provide competent representation." 94 A strong argument could be constructed
that these four rules require that the lawyer provide the information about the
law in the situations we have been considering.95
Rule 1.2(d) also might be interpreted to distinguish between possibilities
for conduct brought forward by the client and those brought forward by the
lawyer. The rule states that a lawyer "may discuss the legal consequences of
any proposed course of conduct," but it does not say "proposed" by whom. On
initial reading, one likely would suppose that because the rule does not specify
who does the proposing, and because it uses the word "any," the "course of
conduct" the "legal consequences" of which may be discussed with the client
could be brought up for consideration either by the lawyer or the client.96 If,
however, this provision is read to apply only to possibilities of fraudulent or
criminal conduct brought up by the client and not to those brought into the
conversation by the lawyer, the overlap between the two parts of 1.2(d) has
been significantly narrowed. In other words, the occasions on which educating
the client about the law will be the functional equivalent of counseling the
client "to" violate the law will be far fewer if the proviso to the primary
prohibition97 is read as only applying to conduct "proposed" by the client.
This understanding would track the distinction discussed in Section F of
Part II, and would run into the difficult concerns raised there. It simply doesn't
seem right that the lawyer should be the originator of client conduct contrary
to the law. But it is also troublesome to say that those who know enough to
90. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 12, Rule 1.4(b).
91. Id. Rule 2.1.
92. Id. Rule 1.2(a).
93. Id. Rule 1.2(d) cmt. para. 6.
94. Id. Rule 1.1.
95. See generally Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
307 (1980); Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049 (1984); Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 24, at
947-49. A contrary interpretation is also possible, finding that a decision to violate the law (whatever that
might be interpreted to mean) is not a "decision" the client is free to make, and is therefore implicitly
excepted from any obligation under Rule 1.4(b). Cf. Nix v. Whiteside. 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that
lawyer's coercion to prevent client's pejurious testimony did not deprive client of right to effective
assistance of counsel).
96. See FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 146; Newman, supra note 5, at 292-94.
97. The rule is stated: "A lawyer shall not .... but a lawyer may ......
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ask will be given full access to the law while those (less sophisticated or more
scrupulous) who don't know enough to ask will be screened from knowledge
of the law. The general provision of 1.2(d) appears to honor the first
perception; the proviso honors the second. The most obvious plain meaning of
1.2(d) in its entirety, including the word "proposed," is in accord more with
the second perception-equal and full access to the law-than with the first.
Aside from the "right" to inform the client concerning "legal
consequences," 1.2(d) also prohibits the lawyer from "counselfing] a client to
engage" or assisting in "criminal or fraudulent" conduct. This language
embodies a large unspoken proviso: the lawyer may suggest or assist in other
tortious conduct, breach of contract, or other legally wrongful conduct.
Consequently, in regard to suggesting or assisting conduct (as opposed to
providing information about the law and legal consequences), the line drawn
for the purposes of lawyer discipline is the civil/criminal line, with a little jog
in the line to take in fraudulent conduct. This may be because fraud is enough
"like" crime to cross the line. Or it may be that the line derives from the
drafters' notion of the malun in selnaluin prohibitumn distinction, with fraud
being like crimes in general, morally wrong in itself. This part of the rule
means that the lawyer whose client is seeking advice concerning a multiyear
contract likely to be very profitable the first years and far less so the later
years may herself suggest to the client the possibility of breach following the
profitable years. And the lawyer consulted by the motel owner may suggest the
possibility of continued knowing usage of the faulty water heaters as possibly
the least costly (in dollars) alternative. 9 (The rule does not determine whether
such conduct by the lawyer in either case would itself be tortious, nor does it
shield the lawyer from possible civil liability for the conduct.)
Model Rule 1.2(d) thus employs two bright lines: the civil/criminal line (or
something very close to it) and the line between providing information about
the law ("legal consequences") and other kinds of "assistance" to the client. To
be prohibited the lawyer's conduct must be on the wrong side of both lines.
The prior rule, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A) (still governing in approximately
ten states, including Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio), is ambiguous on
both these axes: "A lawyer shall not: (7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct
that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent." Is providing correct
information about the law "counsel" or "assistance"? The Model Rule clarifies
that it is not, and adds further clarification by changing prepositions: the
lawyer may not "counsel a client to engage" in the prohibited conduct. Is
98. The one example where advice would be prohibited would be the suggeston by the lawyer to the
motel owner to buy new water heaters on credit, when the lawyer knows the owner could not fulfill the
obligation. See supra part II.F. If such conduct were classified as fraud under the applicablc state law, it
could not be suggested by the lawyer under 1.2(d). Given that the altemative may well be senous physical
injury to an innocent person, application of the rule to such a situation is troubling
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tortious conduct or breach of contract "illegal"? 99 Use of "fraudulent" as an
added category would seem to imply that "illegal" means "criminal," but the
term itself can mean much more. (And an abundance of legal writing, of
course, contains synonymous superfluous words, as "fraudulent" might have
been interpreted to be.) The single definition in a leading law dictionary is far
broader: "Illegal. Against or not authorized by law."'" Neither breach of
contract nor tortious conduct is explicitly "authorized by law," but then they
are not expressly "prohibited" either.
Thus, under Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7) it was quite possible that the
two examples above "from the broad middle ground" would be prohibited.
Providing the client with the relevant legal information about the
(non)enforcement policy of the EPA in regard to the .050 per liter effluent
limit and with the information about the two-percent audit rate could well be
considered "assistance in illegal conduct." An added example from this broad
middle ground, mentioned briefly at the beginning of Part I, further illustrates
the difference between 7-102(A)(7) and 1.2(d) and suggests that the latter
accurately reflects currently accepted lawyer practices. In labor law, lawyers
specializing in the representation of management commonly suggest to
employers wishing to fight a unionization effort or those attempting to "bust"
an existing union that they violate provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA). By engaging in conduct defined by the Act as "unfair labor
practices" the employer can often effectively defeat unionization or at least
seriously demoralize those engaged in the effort. Adjudication by the National
Labor Relations Board of allegations of unfair labor practices typically takes
years, and the remedies are limited to back pay and reinstatement for specified
workers who were the victims of the conduct. Once these facts about the law
and its enforcement are laid before the employer, a simple cost/benefit analysis
(frequently supplemented by the lawyer's explicit recommendation) often leads
the employer intentionally to violate the provisions of the NLRA. °t This
would seem to qualify under normal legal usage as "illegal" conduct by the
client and, if it is, the lawyer is clearly "counseling and assisting" in that
illegal conduct. But it is also clear that such violations of the NLRA are
neither criminal nor fraudulent. Under 7-101(A)(7) the lawyer's conduct
99. See Hazard, supra note 62, at 674-75.
100. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 747 (6th ed. 1990).
101. Robert Gordon discusses this common phenomenon of lawyers systematically subverting the
intention of the law, particularly regulatory law, in Gordon, supra note 72, and Robert W. Gordon,
Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REv. 255 (1990). It is a difficult question whether
the fault here is that of the lawyers (as Gordon suggests) or the law. Ought lawyers (primarily) to educate
their clients as to what the law is, or ought they (primarily) to further the purposes behind the law? They
probably ought to be doing both, but which is primary is a very difficult question. I address it indirectly
in Parts IV and V. In addition to Gordon, see Simon, supra note 17. In previous work I have suggested
that the answer is "both," but that providing "access to law" is primary. See Pepper, Amoral Role, supra
note 3, at 616-24, 630-32; Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 24, at 947-61; Pepper, Rejoinder. supra
note 7, at 662-72.
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appears to be prohibited; under 1.2(d) it appears to be clearly protected. During
the years 7-101(A)(7) was in effect and continuing through the present,"
such conduct by labor lawyers has been open, obvious, and unsanctioned.1
0 3
Beyond this example from regulatory law, the range of possibly prohibited
advice under the term "illegal" in 7-102(A)(7) was vast. Is it assisting in
"illegal" conduct to educate a client concerning the legal consequences of
inserting in a contract a provision held void by the courts? Is it assisting in
"illegal" conduct to provide legal advice to an administrative agency in relation
to continuing conduct held unlawful by the circuit courts of appeal?'" Is it
assisting in illegal conduct to provide legal advice about the consequences of
continuing to manufacture a product held "defective" and "unreasonably
dangerous" by all courts that have adjudicated the question? Most lawyers
would agree that providing such legal advice is not prohibited (although they
might disagree about the wisdom of providing such advice in various
circumstances, and certainly would have different views about how such advice
ought to be given, and what kinds of advice-or caveats-ought to be given
in conjunction with it). Thus most lawyers would agree that 1.2(d) correctly
reflects the accepted practices of lawyering and would also agree that the far
broader possible limits under 7-102(A)(7) did not reflect those practices. In
fact it is likely that the change from the old rule to the new was not intended
to indicate a change of substance, but was instead simply a more precise and
careful drafting of the understood limit on lawyers. The limited available case
law under both rules is the same and supports this understanding.
Turning from the rules to published judicial opinions, one finds very little
on the issues examined in this Article. I have not found a case in which a
lawyer is disciplined or found civilly or criminally liable only on the basis of
providing a client with correct information about the law or legal
consequences, including information about enforcement. This is true of all the
102. The ABA Model Code was passed in 1969 and universally adopted by the staites within a few
years. STEPHEN GILLERS & RoY D. SIMON. JR., REGULATION OF LAwYERs: STATUTES AND STANDARDS
at xv (1995). The ABA Model Rules were passed in 1983 and adopted by the states far more slowly. Id.
at xvi. At this point 38 states have adopted the new rules, excluding a few prominent jurisdictions such as
New York. Id.
103. By unsanctioned I mean not only that there are no reported cases of lawyer discipline (public
reprimand, suspension, or disbarment) but also no other liability; lawyers themselves have not been found
to have violated the NLRA by giving the advice, nor have they been held liable in tort for harming
individual workers or the union, as in an interference-with-contractual-relations cause of action. See text
accompanying notes 106-09.
104. In the early 1980's, the Social Security Administration (SSA) embarked on what became a well-
known and controversial policy of "'nonacquiescence": the Administration did not appeal certain circuit
court opinions to the Supreme Court, but it also refused to follow them-it flouted the announced law
within the circuit. Claimants with knowledgeable lawyers and means to appeal SSA decisions were
governed by the law of the federal court. Those who did not were governed by the agency's contrary
interpretation. The NLRB and the IRS have also engaged in nonacquiescence. See William W. Buzbec,
Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence. 85 COLUM. L REv. 582 (1985); Steven P. Eichel.
"Respectfd Disagreement": Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies in United States Courts
of Appeals Precedents, 18 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 463 (1985).
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examples in the previous two paragraphs as well as those framed earlier. It is
also difficult, however, to find an opinion expressly holding such conduct
permissible. The questions appear to have been rarely litigated. This suggests
that the conduct is so clearly lawful that cases have not been brought.
(Although lawyers would certainly find it more comfortable to have clear case
law so holding t05)
The one exception is the recognized privilege of a lawyer to induce a
client to breach a contract or interfere with a prospective business relationship
not yet rising to the level of contract."° Here there is a substantial body of
case law recognizing that the lawyer (as well as other similarly situated agents)
cannot be found liable for the intentional tort of interference with contract.
This principle is often applied at the pleading and summary judgment stages.
If (1) the lawyer is giving legal advice or recommending conduct within the
scope of the professional relationship, (2) the communication is for the benefit
of the client and not the lawyer as a separate party, and (3) the lawyer's
motive is not "malice" toward the injured party, the privilege applies.'07 That
105. There is substantial reason for the discomfort given the recent development of what might be
termed the "non-law of settlement" applicable to lawyer conduct. From O.P.M. in the early 1980's to Kaye,
Scholer recently, there have been a number of well-publicized, very large settlements by law firms and their
insurers despite the facts that liability was both denied and based upon no clear judicial precedent or other
clearly established rule of law. See Hassett v. McColley (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 28 B.R. 740
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Jones Day Settles OTS Claims on S & L, Will Pay $51 Million, 9 ABA/BNA Law.
Manual on Prof. Conduct 109 (1993); Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse To Frame the Law and Others
Frame It to Their Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075 (1993); Kirk A. Swanson, Debate Continues on Ethics
After Kaye Scholer Accord, 8 ABA/BNA Law. Manual on Prof. Conduct 109 (1992); Steven France, Can
the Bar Regulate the Large Firms?, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, at 28 (discussing New York State Bar's
finding of no basis for proceeding with disciplinary proceedings against Peter Fishbein of Kaye, Scholer);
Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas, Legal Crisis: How a Big Law Firm Was Brought to Knees by Zealous
Regulators, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at Al. The allegations in these cases involved failure to reveal
wrongful conduct by the client, overt false communication, and other overt assistance to wrongful client
conduct well beyond the provision of accurate information about the law and its enforcement. The issues
addressed in this Article did not arise and were not a basis for these settlements.
106. RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6.23 (3d ed. 1989).
One who intentionally causes a third person not to perform a contract or not to enter into a
prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere improperly with the other's
contractual relation, by giving the third person
(a) truthful information, or
(b) honest advice within the scope of a request for the advice.
ldJ; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 (1977).
107. See Los Angeles Airways v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1982) (summarizing and applying
California law); Worldwide Marine Trading v. Marine Transp. Serv., 527 F. Supp. 581 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Schott v. Glover, 440 N.E.2d 376 (11. App. CL 1982); Beatie v. DeLong, 561 N.Y.S.2d 448 (App. Div.
1990). In Fraidin v. Weitzman, 611 A.2d 1046 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), the court approved jury
instructions on the privilege, the last two provisions of which directly restate the underlying problem
addressed in this Article:
Accordingly, if you find that the defendant attorney simply rendered legal advice to his client
within the scope of his representation of the client, and the legal advice is for the client's
benefit and not solely for the lawyer's benefit, then your verdict concerning conspiracy to
intentionally interfere with the contract must be for the defendant lawyers or law firms.
However, an attorney who has actual knowledge that his client is engaged in unlawful activity
may not aid, assist or encourage the carrying on of that unlawful activity.
Id. at 1078.
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the doctrine is formally recognized only in regard to interference with contract
reinforces the intuition that this is the least objectionable context for advice
that leads to violation of a legal norm. It is also possible, however, that this is
the only area in which lawyers have become defendants with sufficient
frequency for a doctrine to evolve. This may be so because it is in contractual
and commercial situations, as opposed to situations involving tortious conduct
or crimes, that potential litigants or their lawyers are likely (a) to surmise that
legal advice led to arguably unlawful conduct and (b) to see significant
advantage in adding a professional defendant with substantial liability
insurance. The doctrine does appear to be expanding to cover advice that leads
to an arguable violation of the antitrust laws, suggesting a more general
applicability than to just the tort of interference with contract or advantageous
business relationship.10 8
Cases in which lawyers are disciplined or found legally responsible in
some other way always include more active involvement in the client's
wrongful conduct than the provision of correct advice about the law."° For
example, in the well-known In re Ryder case, the court, relying upon the
precursor of DR 7-107(A)(7), disciplined a lawyer for transferring a sawed-off
shotgun and stolen money from his client's safe-deposit box to a nearby box
rented in his own name."' That conduct constituted active assistance in
criminal conduct (concealing stolen property and receipt and possession of an
unlawful firearm), assistance well beyond either giving accurate legal advice
or keeping client confidences. A more typical situation, closer to the issues we
have been considering, occurred in People v. Cali."' John Blosser was an
employee of Gates Energy Products. He was about to be relocated, and was
eligible for reimbursement of certain moving expenses connected with the sale
of employee residences, including brokerage fees. Blosser, however, did not
own a home; he lived with his sister. Blosser consulted Calt, who advised him
to have the sister quitclaim the house to him and then "sell" it back. The sister
refused and Calt then prepared and signed "a fraudulent statement of
settlement" reflecting "broker's fees and other costs related to the imaginary
sale of the residence." Calt received over three-fifths of the fraudulently
108. See Brown v. Donco Enters., 783 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986). Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Ass'n
v. Tillamook County Creamery Ass'n. 358 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1966): Invictus Records v American
Broadcasting Cos., 98 F.R.D. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Worldwide Manne Trading. 527 F Supp. 581
(allegations of both antitrust violations and tortious interference with contract).
109. See Newman, supra note 5.
110. 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967). The court held that Ryder had
violated former Canons 15 and 32. Canon 32 stated in part: "No client ... is entitled to receivc nor should
any lawyer render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are .. ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs Canon 32 (1908). Canon 15 stated in part: "But it is steadfastly to be
home in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of
the law." Id. Canon 15. Ryder was suspended from practice before the federal court for 18 months. 263
F. Supp. at 370.
111. 817 P.2d 969 (Colo. 1991).
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obtained reimbursement as his fee. Relying upon DR 7-107(A)(7) and three
other disciplinary rules, the court disbarred him.'
2
Note that Calt did two things beyond merely advising about what would
constitute a fraudulent claim, the legal consequences of fraud, and how it
might be detected. He both advised Blosser to arrange the sham transactions
and actively prepared fraudulent documents. The first goes beyond legal advice
to overt recommendation of fraudulent conduct; the second goes well beyond
legal advice and beyond communication with the client in general to active
assistance and facilitation of the fraud. This is characteristic of the cases
finding lawyer liability for assisting in unlawful conduct by the client. The
lawyer has done more than just advise about the law, legal consequences, and
enforcement of the law."3 In fact there are few reported cases of lawyer
discipline or other liability based only upon the first wrong, recommendation
of unlawful conduct, without some additional more active assistance.", Calt
is characteristic here as well in that the wrong goes beyond just
recommendation into active assistance. It may be that this simply reflects the
fact that lawyers usually do more than just communicate about the law, the
client's options, and what the client ought to do; they follow such
communication with active assistance in the conduct chosen by the client. Or
it may mean that we have in practice a recognized line: the client can be told
about "the law" in the broadest sense, even if that is functionally equivalent
to suggesting or assisting in its violation, but the lawyer may not go beyond
that communication with the client to some form of active assistance.
112. Id. at 970-71. In addition to DR 7-107(A)(7) the court relied upon DR 1-102(A)(3) (a lawyer
shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude) and DR 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Id. Most cases of lawyer
discipline similarly rest upon more than one rule, and usually this is combined with more than one kind
of wrongdoing. A body of precedent made up of decisions with this kind of unclarified reliance on several
rules and several wrongs renders it difficult to determine any clear judicial interpretation or gloss for
individual rules.
113. In Pierce v. Lyman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236 (Ct. App. 1991), for example, a case concerning alleged
dissipation of trust assets by the trustees and their attorneys, the court overturned the sustaining of
demurrers against the lawyers, noting, "More than the simple rendering of legal advice to respondents'
clients is alleged. More than mere knowledge of the breach of fiduciary duty are [sic] alleged. Active
concealment, misrepresentations to the court, and self-dealing for personal financial gain are described."
Id at 243; see also Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1080 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding New
York doctrine that "an attorney is privileged to give honest advice, even if erroneous, and generally is not
responsible for the motives of his client" inapplicable because privilege "does not create a license to act
maliciously, fraudulently, or knowingly to tread upon the legal rights of others").
114. In Townsend v. State Bar of Cal., 197 P.2d 326 (Cal. 1948), the lawyer was suspended for three
years on the stated basis that he advised his client to make a fraudulent conveyance to frustrate a judgment
he knew was about to be announced. The facts as laid out by the court, however, indicate that in addition
to recommending the conduct he also prepared the deed (knowing it was to be used in a fraudulent fashion)
and backdated it to facilitate the fraud. Id at 327-29. In Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kerpelman, 420
A.2d 940 (Md. 1980), the lawyer was disciplined for advising a client to take his child from the mother
contrary to an outstanding custody order. Several other wrongs were also the basis for discipline, however,
and the lawyer had admitted advising many clients to engage in "child snatching." Id. at 958. Also, see In
re Bullowa, 229 N.Y.S. 145 (App. Div. 1928) and the cases collected at CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS'N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 39 (2d ed.
1992) (section entitled "Advising The Client to Engage in Criminal or Fraudulent Conduct").
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Looking at the law from a different angle, the result is the same. The
Restatements of Torts and Agency and the Model Penal Code contain language
providing that one who assists another in unlawful conduct may be liable in
addition to the principal, and do not provide an exception for the conduct of
a lawyer.' For example, a Comment in the Restatement of Agency states
in part: "An Agent who assists ... the principal to commit a tort is normally
himself liable as a joint tortfeasor for the entire damage."'" 6 Similarly, the
Restatement of Torts states: "For harm resulting to a third person from the
tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he ... (b) knows that
the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself .. ..""' There are no
cases reported under either section, however, that impose liability upon a
lawyer whose only assistance consists of giving accurate legal advice."' The
situation is similar in criminal law. New York has a criminal facilitation statute
that provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation in the fourth degree [the
lowest] when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid: 1. to a
person who intends to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which
provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission
thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a
felony .... 19
115. For a discussion of these provisions and their implications, see Hazard. supra note 62. at 677-82
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 cmt. d (1957). Section 343 itself states:
An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted
at the command of the principal or on account of the principal, except where he is exercising
a privilege of the principal, or a privilege held by him for the protection of the principal's
interests, or where the principal owes no duty or less than the normal duty of care to the person
harmed.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977).
118. Early in his article, Professor Hazard notes the "spectrum" of possible assistance, from only
providing accurate information about the law ("expert definition of the limits of the law") to overt actions
carrying out illegal conduct ("provid[ing] the means without which the client could not achieve the illicit
purpose.") At this point he concludes: "The law clearly sanctions providing asststance at the least
instrumental end of this spectrum. The law clearly prohibits conduct at the other end." Hazard. supra note
62, at 671. Near the conclusion, Professor Hazard correctly notes: "In most of the cases, the lawyer has
overtly assisted his client in accomplishing manifestly illegal purposes." Id. at 682. The explicit conclusion
of the article, however, conveys a contrary implication: If the "lawyer facilitates the client's course of
conduct either by giving advice that encourages the client to pursue the conduct or indicates how to reduce
the risks of detection, or by performing an act that substantially furthers the course of conduct." he or she
is subject to liability. I. (emphasis added). A careful reading of the cases cited by Professor Hazard
suggests that it is the earlier conclusion that is more likely to be correct than the implications that could
be taken from the latter. For example, In re Feltman. 237 A.2d 473 (NJ. 1968). is cited for the proposition
that "courts have held that it is improper for a lawyer to give advice as to how to commit a crime or
fraud." Hazard, supra note 62, at 682. The opinion, however, states explicitly that the reprimand is not
based upon the advice given by the lawyer, but rather is due to the fact that the lawyer transmitted for
signature an acknowledgment of service "untrue on its face." Felrnan. 237 A.2d at 474. In this regard, also
consider In re Giordano, 229 A.2d 524 (NJ. 1967) and Townsend (described supra note 114). both cited
by Professor Hazard, supra note 62, at 682.
119. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.00 (McKinney 1987).
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There are no cases under the New York statute concerning liability of a lawyer
for the conduct of her client. Similarly, in the three other states that have
adopted similar facilitation statutes, there is not one reported case involving the
liability of a lawyer for giving legal advice. 2
In sum, the law provides little in the way of constraint or guidance in
relation to the problem we have been exploring. The law does indicate that
lawyers may not recommend or assist criminal or fraudulent conduct. The
lawyer may, however, provide accurate information about the law (and "legal
consequences"); and apparently may do so even if that information functions
as recommendation or assistance. Short of criminal and fraudulent conduct, the
law appears to indicate that the lawyer may not only educate the client about
the law, but also may suggest conduct contrary to law. (There is, however,
disturbingly little case law to reassure the lawyer of the propriety of such
advice.) At its current state of development, the law thus appears to grant the
lawyer a great deal of discretion in the situations we have been considering.
IV. COUNSELING AND CHARACTER
A. Four Premises
For the lawyer who has worked her way through all of the above, what
guidance is there? The law tells her that she may discuss the legal
consequences of all potential conduct with the client, but does not tell her that
she must.' The seven distinctions developed above provide a process to
assist analysis, a mode for initiating, testing, and refining intuition. But they
rarely yield a specific or concrete answer, presenting instead a picture of the
complexity and difficulty of the problem. In sum, they usually provide
significant clarification, but only partial guidance.
Aside from the lawyer's own devices and intuition, which are discussed
briefly below, 22 are there other premises or foundations that can provide
guidance? Several such bases were mentioned in Part I, and a summary of
these places to start may be helpful at this point. The first premise is that law
is a public good that is intended to be available for individuals to use in
leading their lives. In other words, the fundamental purpose of law is to be
120. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-1004 (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 506.080-506.100
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-02 (1985). Hazard, supra note 62, at 681-82,
discusses §§ 2.06(1), 2.06(2)(c), and 2.06(3)(a)(ii) of the Model Penal Code (1985) dealing with accomplice
liability, suggesting that such provisions might provide a basis for criminal liability for the lawyer.
Annotations to the Model Penal Code provide no indication, however, that lawyers have been found guilty
under such provisions for providing accurate advice about the law and how it will be enforced. As to the
cases cited by Professor Hazard in this regard, see supra note 118.
121. Except to the extent required by Model Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, and 2.1. See supra text accompanying
notes 90-95.
122. See infra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
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available to guide conduct. This means that a client has a clear interest in, and
perhaps even an entitlement to, knowledge of the law that governs her.'
The second premise is that the primary function of lawyers as professionals is
to assist their clients, and a core part of that role is to provide access to law
that is otherwise inaccessible to most lay clients.'2- (A corollary of this
premise is that judging or policing clients is not a primary lawyer role,
although it may be appropriate at some margins. " ) The third premise is that
a lawyer's assistance to a client is bounded by the limits of the law; a lawyer
should not assist a client in unlawful conduct.
In the context of the situations considered in this Article, these three
premises suggest a fundamental problem: determining the weight of the client's
entitlement to knowledge of the law and balancing it against the weight of
society's interest in preventing lawyers from assisting in the violation of law
and legal norms. My own sense is that the notion of "secret law" is
incompatible with a conception of citizens as free and equal and the
government as the servant of the people. This understanding is subject,
however, to the considerable difficulties and complexities of deciding what
counts as "law" under what sorts of situations, which we have been examining.
It is also subject to those considerations that may well justify "acoustic
separation" in regard to some enforcement policies and practices. Thus, the
seven distinctions factor in and complicate any reckoning of the balance.
Limited by that very substantial caveat, I would still maintain that our
democratic constitutional order presumes that persons do have something
approaching a "right" to know "the law" that purports to govern them. (The
notion of keeping the knowledge from them implies, disturbingly, someone or
some institution on high deciding who is to know what about the law.)
In my opinion the first two premises therefore justify a rebuttable
presumption that it is generally appropriate for the lawyer to educate the client
concerning the law, and that is a significant starting point for the lawyer
pondering what to do. The third premise and the distinctions explored in
Part II strongly suggest, however, that there are occasions when that
presumption is rebutted, and the client does not have the "right" to be
123. A substantial argument could be constructed supporting the proposition that there is a
constitutional right to know the law that governs one's conduct. The argument would build by analogy
upon cases such as NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401
U.S. 576 (1971). In the latter the Court stated: "The common thread running through our decisions in
NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United Mine W orkers is that collective activity undertaken to obtain
meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protecuon of the First Amendment.- Id.
at 585. Knowledge of a legal basis for a claim would appear to be a necessary antecedent to **access to the
courts"; and in several ways the right would appear to be more fundamental than the one constructed in
the Button line of cases.
124. This argument is developed further in Heller. supra note 21; Pepper. Amoral Role. supra note
3; and Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 24.
125. William Simon and David Luban have framed justifications for a far greater amount of judging
(or policing) in the lawyer role than has been traditionally understood or accepted. LUBAN. supra note 34,
at 1-234; Simon, supra note 17.
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informed of the law-or law-related information-that will govern or judge his
conduct. These three premises taken together essentially restate our basic
problem. 2 6 Reformulated as a rebuttable presumption in favor of the client
learning relevant law and legal considerations, they suggest a beginning
orientation (or bias), but they do not provide a methodology for determining
when the lawyer should decide the presumption has been rebutted.
Reconsider for a moment (1) the motel owner and (2) the party negotiating
a long-term contract and contemplating the possibility of breaching it several
years down the line. A thoughtful application of the seven distinctions to each
of these situations does not yield determinate guidance as to what legal
information ought to be conveyed or withheld. Where does the lawyer turn
next? Two observations related to the premises mentioned above seem
apposite. First, although the lives of lawyer and client have come together
here, the lawyer ought to remember that it is the client's life that is primarily
involved. It is the client who owns and has invested much of his life in the
motels; it is the client who will be making the choice about whether to
continue in business with the defective water heaters. It is the client who will
or will not enter into the long-term contracts, with or without the secret
intention or inclination to breach (and maybe with breach as just one of several
planned possibilities). This suggests that the decision to be made is primarily
the client's, and that withholding arguably "legal" information is wrong.'27
On the other hand, there is, in each case, a potential victim to consider, a third
party who may be significantly harmed by the client. Communicating only the
law as expansively understood (the legal realist view) too often amounts (from
the client's perspective) to encouragement to engage in wrongful conduct
contrary to legal norms.128 Thus, communicating only the law too often
functions as assistance in unlawful conduct that may injure a third party.
I would therefore add a fourth foundation, a premise that will provide a
different kind of perspective on the problem and will draw us toward a
different kind of process for resolving it. That premise is that the lawyer ought
not assume her client's goals or desires. She ought not assume that the client
desires the maximum possible wealth or freedom.'29 She ought not assume
her client is Holmes' "bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which [legal] knowledge enables him to predict."' t3 The way to avoid such
126. They also restate, to some extent, the most apposite of the Model Rules. The first two premises
are reflected in Model Rule 1.4(b), quoted in full in Part III; the third is embodied in Model Rule 1.2(d),
discussed at length in Part III.
127. The extent to which this factor ought to be discounted if the client is a large corporation and not
a person may be substantial, but is beyond the scope of this Article. See infra note 137 and accompanying
text.
128. This was discussed briefly in Part I.C.
129. See Pepper, Amoral Role, supra note 3, at 630-31; see also Warren Lehman, The Pursuit of a
Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078, 1084-97 (1979); Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 24, at
944-49.
130. Holmes, supra note 15, at 459.
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disrespectful assumptions is to talk to the client, to explore with the client his
situation, desires, and preferences, and to discuss how the law impacts or
interacts with all of these. This strategy points toward the process of dialogue
and counseling, an approach to the problem that supplements the factor
analysis developed over the course of this Article. When confronted with
situations raising the issues discussed in this Article, the lawyer ought not just
think and analyze. In addition, the lawyer ought to talk with the client.
Does the client negotiating the contract really intend to breach it in three
years? Or is she merely curious about that possibility? By conversing with her
about the obligations contracts may entail aside from the law, and about the
injuries she might be imposing upon the relying promisee, a lawyer may both
learn and reveal pertinent information, and may also help the client shape her
intentions and conduct. Similarly, the conversation with the motel owner may
explore how severe an impact a serious bum can have on an accident victim,
how important continued operation of the business is to the owner, and how
these two relate. The more the lawyer learns from the client, the more she will
know concerning how real her dilemma is. If it turns out that the client may
use information about the law to violate it, she will have gained more
information, more nuance, to assist her in an analysis of how she ought to
proceed. In addition, such a conversation may itself alter the preferences or
intentions of the client (and the lawyer), and thus may expand the
possibilities.
131
Imagine two different lawyers. One is the arm's-length lawyer, who wants
a relatively brief and clear understanding of (1) the situation that has brought
the client to the lawyer and (2) the client's desires. The second is the lawyer
as counselor, who wants a fuller, more rounded and contextualized picture of
the client and his situation, needs, and desires. Kenneth Mann in his book
Defending White-Collar Crime discusses the common situation in which the
client has documents useful in proving his guilt, but destruction of the
documents would be an additional crime. One lawyer states:
131. What I am recommending here, I have called elsewhere the -moral dtalogue- between lawyer
and client. It is appropriate not just for the kind of situations examined in this Article, but for the entire
relationship between lawyer and client. See Pepper. Amoral Role. supra note 3. at 630-32; Pepper.
Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 24, at 944-50. This concept is derived from the work of Professor Thomas
Shaffer. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRIS'nAN AND A LAWYER (1981); THo.tAS L
SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR.. LAWYERS. CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESpONSIBtIUIy (1994). For
examinations of some of the issues involved in client counseling. see SAMNIONS. supra note 47; Robert D.
Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement. 32 ARIZ. L REv. 501 (1990);
Stephen Ellmann. Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in
Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups. 78 VA. L. REv. 1103 (1992); Stephen Ellmann.
Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987); Thomas D. Morgan. Thinking About Lawyers as
Counselors, 42 U. FLA. L. REV. 439 (1990); William H. Simon. Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs.
Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REv. 213 (1991). For an argument that counseling along these lines ought to be
required of lawyers, see Peter Margulies, "Who Are You To Tell MAe That?". 68 N.C. L REv 213 (1990).
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There are many cases in which one would surmise that documents
summoned from the client existed at the time the summons was
issued. My function in this procedure is a very limited one. I, of
course, do not want the client convicted of an obstruction of justice
charge, and I do warn him of the dire consequences of such a
happening. But in the end it is the client's choice. I have no doubt
that clients destroy documents. Have I ever "known" of such an
occurrence? No. But you put two and two together. You couldn't
convict anyone on such circumstantial evidence, but you can draw
your own conclusion.' 32
Whom is the lawyer protecting here? And what kind of counseling image is
conjured up? I see a lawyer with a straight arm up, keeping the client away,
and I imagine a lonely client, a client getting cryptic, implied advice that he
must interpret on his own, without direct help from his lawyer.
If you were the client in the water pollution or euthanasia examples, which
kind of lawyer would you want? Would you prefer an "arm's-length" lawyer
like the one quoted above, or a lawyer willing to connect and advise
concerning the entirety of the situation, a lawyer willing to listen and assist
you in coming to your own, perhaps difficult, conclusion? Imagine you have
a dreadfully ill elderly spouse or parent with no chance of recovery and no end
in sight soon. The ill person is in great pain and distress and has no desire for
his or her life to go on; he or she wants and is ready to die. At wit's end, and
perhaps having difficulty thinking as clearly as you usually do, you are
considering finding a way to give your loved one his or her wish. You consult
your lawyer, or a lawyer.'33 Which of the following lawyers would you
prefer to meet? The first lawyer, who listens politely, asks a few questions and
then tells you that ending your loved one's life would be murder: the conduct
132. KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 110 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting
lawyer on lawyer-client relationship in IRS procedures).
133. Given the public image of lawyers, why would you consult a lawyer, you may be wondering.
Perhaps the doctors are not particularly sympathetic or easy to talk to; perhaps you do not have a family
practitioner to assist you through the medical maze; perhaps you do not know a minister with whom you
feel comfortable broaching this subject; perhaps you just cannot talk to whatever friends you have about
this; or perhaps you want an "objective" or "professional" view of the matter. Maybe you want to know
what guidance the law has for you, or whether such conduct is criminal. Maybe you think lawyers are
smart, knowledgeable people; or maybe you knew a lawyer in the past whose judgment was good and who
was helpful.
Clients will share things with their lawyers (and doctors), sometimes within the first five
minutes, that they will not share with their closest friends. Sometimes they seek out a lawyer
because the lawyer is not one of their friends. (One of us, Cochran, once had a steady stream
of clients who came to him because he did not go to their church.) The sympathetic detachment
of the lawyer may enable the lawyer to say things (moral things) to a client that the lawyer
would hesitate to say to a friend.
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., TEACHER'S MANUAL To ACCOMPANY LAWYERS,
CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIEILITY 30 (1994); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 850-53 (1987) (characterizing lawyers' distinctive capacity for good judgment as
combination of sympathy and detachment).
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you are considering is criminal.' 3* The penalties are severe. Silence. The
second lawyer provides you with the same information about the law as the
first lawyer. In addition, however, this lawyer seeks further information about
the illness and prognosis, about the source for your conclusions that no end is
in sight and no improvement is possible, that the pain is immense and the
person would prefer to die. Having provided reasonably persuasive answers to
his questions, this lawyer informs you that the situation is sympathetic, and
that a prosecutor might choose not to prosecute on such facts. He tells you that
such a decision would be far more likely if the event received no attention in
the news media, and even more likely if it never came to the attention of the
prosecutor. Even if you were prosecuted, he tells you, the situation is
sufficiently sympathetic that a jury might well ignore the judge's instructions
concerning the legal requirements for murder, and acquit you. Knowing of this
possibility, and perhaps herself sympathetic, the prosecutor might offer an
attractive plea bargain, possibly one involving no incarceration. The lawyer is
for the most part willing to answer your questions and continue discussing all
these legal aspects of your situation.'
A third lawyer provides the same information as the first, and much of the
information provided by the second. This lawyer, however, pauses to observe
that you seem to be extremely upset. He suggests that perhaps there is some
solution-some help-short of the drastic action you are contemplating. He
asks about the assistance you are getting from the physicians involved; what
kind of nursing care you have; whether you have any support in caring for
your loved one; whether the hospital or physicians have connected you with
a social worker or social agency that might be helpful; whether you have
sought assistance from a hospice; what financial resources you might have to
obtain the support he is suggesting. He asks whom you have to talk to about
what you are considering doing and what alternatives there might be to doing
it. He says that he would be willing to give you further legal advice along the
lines you are asking, but first, if you are willing, he would like to make some
phone calls to get you the names and numbers of people and institutions that
134. In most jurisdictions, assisting in a suicide is criminal, even if it is not murder. See Juliana Reno.
Comment, A Little Help from My Friends: The Legal Status of Assisted Suicide. 25 CREIGIrrOX L REv
1151, 1175--83 (1992); Catherine D. Shaffer, Note. Criminal Dabit-yfor Assisting Suicide. 86 COLUMt. L
REv. 348 (1986). For purposes of simplifying the alternatives, the distinction between murder and assisted
suicide will not be included in our hypothesized legal advice.
135. When you ask about the significance of telling the truth or lying about your state of mind. the
second lawyer tells you that lying would be perjury, and therefore he feels that he cannot give you further
advice about that possibility. See TRAVER, supra note 79, see also F.EEDMAN, supra note 8. at 156-58
(discussing TRAVER, supra note 79). 1 discuss this problem briefly above. See supra part II.G. When you
pursue the possibility that your conduct might never come to the attention of the prosecutor, you get a
similar answer. Hiding a crime is itself criminal, and the lawyer cannot assist you. Note that these responses
are not clearly required under Model Rule 1.2(d). which allows a lawyer to discuss "the legal consequences
of any proposed course of conduct." MODEL RuLES, supra note 12. Rule 1.2(d); see supra part Ill.
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might be of some help."36 If you feel unable to make such calls, he offers to
talk to you about which services you might be interested in pursuing and to
make some calls on your behalf. And, if you have no one else to talk with, or
feel uncomfortable talking to anyone else, he offers to continue the
conversation later in the day, or the next, whenever the two of you can
schedule time together. In sum, he suggests that you work toward finding
alternatives and that he is willing to assist.
How do you rank these lawyers? With which would you rather be dealing?
The first two lawyers are dealing with the law, less and more expansively
understood. The third lawyer is, in addition, willing to look beyond the legal
aspects of the client's situation, to look beyond the client as a legal
hypothetical to which the lawyer ought to apply the law, and to assist the
client as a person first and as a legal problem second. The second conversation
strikes me as more honest, fair, and helpful to the client than the first
conversation. The dangers of the second conversation, with which this Article
has been primarily concerned, can be significantly ameliorated by using the
techniques of the third lawyer. The counseling mode for lawyers that I
envision reflects some combination of the second and third lawyers.
Information about the law as more expansively understood should be mixed
with information about the client's problem or situation as more expansively
understood. (It should be noted that such a mixture in many cases will mean
that at the conclusion of the conversation it will no longer be possible to
withhold information about the law; it will have already been conveyed as part
of the ongoing exchange.)
Conversations combining the second and third lawyers' approaches can be
imagined for each of the examples provided in this Article. Of course, the
nature of the imagined conversation differs with each situation. It also differs
quite significantly if we are positing a corporate client, with a legally and
socially defined primary concern with profit and loss, rather than the more
global and varied concerns of an individual human life." 7 But in the
136. The Comment to Model Rule 2.1 suggests the appropriateness of such referrals:
Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another
profession. Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of
psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters can involve problems within
the competence of the accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation with
a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the
lawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best
often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations
of experts.
MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 2.1 cmL
137. When the client is a large corporation, it may be more likely that society or third persons or
entities are vulnerable to the corporation than that the corporation is vulnerable in relation to the lawyer.
That fact renders the traditional understanding of the professional role as protecting the client problematic.
See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 612-17 (1985). It
also weakens the presumption in favor of revealing all relevant legal information suggested in the text at
the beginning of this Section. Such considerations are relevant, but draw us beyond the scope of this
Article. For a sketch of three basic dichotomies influencing how one perceives issues of lawyers' ethics,
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corporate setting as well--or perhaps in the corporate setting particularly--the
lawyer ought not to presume that the client's interest is the greatest possible
profit. 3 Imagine counseling the corporate officer in the water pollution
case, 139 or in the case of the contemplated breach of contract and three-year
docket delay.' 4 There is certainly room in the water pollution case for
inquiry about whether the .025 per liter additional ammonia discharge is likely
to harm persons, animals, or property, and if so, how much and how likely.
There is also room to discover to what extent the client values or feels bound
by the law as written, just because it is the law. Further, the degree to which
the client agrees with or feels bound by the purposes of the law (as opposed
to the letter of the law) is relevant to the choices to be made, and will vary
significantly from client to client.'14 It would also be imperative to discover
whether the client prefers to stay well inside any arguable legal line, or has
reasons for risking a closer passage. If the client has such reasons, their
importance can be explored and weighed.4 2 There is room in the contract
situation for inquiry into (1) the nature of the relationship in which the contract
breach is being considered, (2) what is to be gained by the breach, and the
overall long- and short-term value of that gain, and (3) the extent of the injury
the other party would suffer from the breach. If the other party would likely
be bankrupted, causing the loss of jobs and income for long-term friends and
acquaintances (as well as for a significant number of employees not personally
known by the client's managers), and the gain to the client is short-term and
modest in relation to the corporation's overall financial situation, the
professional managers of the client may decide that short-term profits are not
the determinative factor. Aside from such an unusual moral balance, the client
may have a more normative understanding of the obligation of contract-as a
binding promise-than contemporary contract law seems to have.
There are many lawyers who believe that such conversations are
inappropriate for lawyers because they do not involve "legal" advice and
expertise. As one reader of a draft of this Article put it: "You couldn't bill for
see Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 24, at 939 n.l.
138. In fact, the relationship between corporate client and senior counsel is often long-standing and.
for in-house counsel at least, "intimate." Prospects for moral dialogue may be quite substantial in such
contexts. See HAZARD, supra note 38, at 141-44.
139. See supra part I.B.
140. See U
141. See Heller, supra note 21, at 2516-23.
142. In relation to regulatory compliance counseling-the kind of situation we have in the water
pollution example-Robert Gordon suggests a "crude typology" of advice: "[Llawycrs can choose among
actual compliance, cosmetic compliance, nullification-by-resistance or the 'Holmesian bad man's' strategy
of violate-and-pay, or any combination of these." Gordon. supra note 101. at 277 (citation omitted). He
provides a more extended list of the possibilities in Gordon. supra note 72, at 26-28. The availability and
appropriateness of all these possibilities depend on the context: the client's needs, desires. openness to
alternatives, receptiveness to lawyer counseling, the nature of the legal regulation and its enforcement, and
so on. See also Heller, supra note 21, at 2514-30 (describing 'full-picture counseling" and applying it to
Zo Baird case).
1995] 1605
The Yale Law Journal
that at the firm I worked at."'' 43 But note that the business manager might not
mention such factors because she thinks her role is confined by allegiance to
profits for shareholders; and the lawyer, similarly, might not mention them
because to do so is to step outside the role of providing purely legal advice
and assistance. As one of my students put it, the two may "play off" one
another, avoiding issues that might be persuasive to each if they could be
considered.
In this context I will mention briefly the well-known case of Spaulding v.
Zimmerman,' 4 reprinted in several professional responsibility course books.
A lawyer represented a defendant driver in a suit for physical injuries suffered
by the plaintiff in a car accident. The physician hired by the defendant
discovered a potentially fatal aneurysm not discovered by the plaintiff's
physicians, and this was not revealed when the case was settled. The major
point suggested in the books is: how could the lawyer have risked an innocent
life for the financial benefit of the client? I wonder why we assume that the
middle-level manager in the defendant's insurance company-the person
probably responsible for settlement decisions-is likely to be more concerned
with company profits (or with his career advancement or security) than with
the possible death of the plaintiff, or why we think that manager is likely to
have less moral sensitivity than the lawyer. If anything can explain the facts
underlying this case, it is probably the lawyer and client "playing off" one
another: lawyer and corporate client 145 each assuming a "hardball" money-
oriented stance, neither pausing to consider a wider context, neither urging
such consideration on the other. If either had focused upon and articulated to
the other the possibility that they might cause the death of an innocent person,
they might have sought a more creative solution to their problem. (One also
wonders about the ethics of the physician hired by the defendant who
discovered the plaintiff's aneurysm, but did not insist that someone inform the
patient.)
For the lawyer who is not presuming her client's goals or desires, for the
lawyer who wants to counsel more in the third lawyer mold, there are many
directions such conversations might take. One of the difficulties in taking
seriously such a counseling model for lawyering is the fact that such imagined
conversations have so many possibilities and it is difficult to track or
143. Both the Model Rules and the MacCrate Report, however, support discussing nonlegal
considerations with clients. MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 2.1 & cmt.; AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 213 (1992) ("MacCrate Report"). The latter encourages
lawyers to counsel clients "to take considerations of justice, fairness, and morality into account when the
client makes decisions or engages in conduct that may have an adverse effect on other individuals or on
society." Id.
144. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
145. The insured was in fact the client, but the insurance company was almost certainly functioning
as the client in regard to the relevant decisions.
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hypothesize a complete conversation. Regardless of the specifics of any
particular conversation, it should be clear that on some occasions a dialogue
along these lines will lead to a decision by the client that removes the ethical
problems explored in this Article. Sometimes the client will conclude that the
potential conduct at issue is wrong under the circumstances, causes more harm
than justifiable gain, or is just not worth the risks. If that occurs the lawyer no
longer need be concerned that her advice about the law may facilitate violation
of the law. Even if the problem does not disappear in this way, however, the
lawyer who pursues something like the counselor-lawyer approach will know
more about the situation than will a lawyer who does not. Perhaps more
important, she will probably have gained more of a feel for her client, the
situation, and her relation to the client.
B. Marching into the Swamp
The four premises just canvassed provide direction, information, and a
process, but there will be many occasions when they do not delineate a clear
solution to the kind of problems examined here. The law indicates that the
lawyer may "discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of
conduct.""' It provides that permission as an exception to a more general
provision prohibiting assistance in unlawful conduct, and otherwise gives little
further guidance. The seven distinctions discussed in Part II are helpful, but
often will not be determinative. In working through those distinctions, and in
trying to deal with this problem systematically, I have often felt as though I
were marching into a swamp. The sensation from so many distinctions and
ways of looking at the problem, none of which provides intuitively clear
direction or solid ground underfoot, is that one's ideas are slowly spreading out
and sinking.
This should come as no surprise. Moral questions are often too complex
and multifaceted to lend themselves to rule-bound solutions." 7 But if basic
premises, legal rules, and the analysis of relevant factors are not determinative,
where does the lawyer turn? Where does her intuition (to be refined by
consideration of the seven distinctions elaborated above) come from, and
where does it go after the process of refinement is inconclusive? What
provides her with a moral base from which to engage in dialogue and
counseling with the client? The neo-Aristotelian understanding of ethics is
attractive here, for it appears to provide descriptively accurate answers to such
questions. This understanding suggests that both the lawyer's moral intuition
146. MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.2(d) (emphasis added).
147. See, e.g., Stuart Hampshire, Public and Private Morahy. In PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY
(Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978); Reed E. Loder. Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct: SaInater for Thirst.
I GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311 (1987). Hampshire argues that inarticulable (and perhaps unidentifiable) good
reasons may be the basis for educated moral intuition.
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and her choices after analytic refinement and education of that intuition will
be determined by her character. Moral perception t48 and decision making are
determined not primarily by rules or principles, not primarily by cognitively
processed analytic choices, but primarily by character. Moral character in turn
is made up of habits of moral perception and conduct.
How does one acquire such moral habits? From living and growing in a
community that is itself part of a tradition, from parents, teachers, and mentors;
in short, the way children grow into adults. Such inclinations or habits of
perception and conduct-some call them virtues-grow out of, and are part of,
larger-scale practices, which are themselves part of the larger tradition and
community.'49 The interesting possibility for our problem is whether the
practice of law can provide a locus for such "practices," whether it can
constitute the kind of community and tradition that can nurture virtue and
character.
Thomas Shaffer recounts some of his early experience in the practice of
law, suggesting that he found mentors who could provide the modeling
necessary for the development of professional character (that is, the
development of habits and a disposition that lead to knowing the right, the
moral, way to behave in the kinds of situations explored in this Article).'"0
If the analyses we have considered do not provide a clear answer, or a reliable
path to the right answer, can I assume that my students will encounter in the
148. The perception comes before and may well determine the choice made (or the absence of
awareness of a choice), and thus may be more important than the choice itself. Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics,
supra note 24, at 953 (commenting and drawing on work of Thomas Shaffer).
149. My sketch of the neo-Aristotelian view of ethics is drawn primarily from Alasdair Maclntyro.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1985). Thomas Shaffer has introduced this view to the
discussion of lawyers' ethics. See, e.g., THOMAS SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES
(1991); THOMAS SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION Topics (1985):
SHAFFER, supra note 131.
By relying on Maclntyre and Shaffer, I do not intend to adopt their criticism of liberal political
principles, such as pluralism, toleration, and rights. For an argument that the two perspectives are to a large
degree compatible, see Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 24. For the most part, I believe Jeffrey Stout
is correct in this comment on Maclntyre:
Our society and its distinctive modes of public discourse are best viewed, I would argue, as the
result of a manifest failure to achieve agreement on a fully detailed conception of the good---as
the arrangements and conventions of people who contracted, in effect, to limit the damage of
that failure by settling for a thinner conception of the good that more people could agree to,
given the alternatives and until something better came along. The language of human rights and
respect for persons can be seen as a conceptual outgrowth of institutions and compromises
pragmatically justified under historical circumstances where a relatively thin conception of the
good is the most that people can secure rational agreement on. I support Maclntyre's verdict
on standard philosophical defenses of this language. I share his desire to rehabilitate talk about
the virtues and the common good. But I am less suspicious than he is of the language of rights
and respect itself. I am also less disposed to assume that talk about rights and respect cannot
live in harmony with talk about virtues and the good.
JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL 225 (1988); see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)
(describing liberal political morality and its relationship to community). The lawyer's ethical role and
obligations are quite directly formed as a result of the lawyer's position between the law and the client and
her rights. See Pepper, Amoral Role, supra note 3; Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 24; Pepper,
Rejoinder, supra note 7.
150. THOMAS SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 130-43 (1987).
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practice of law an environment such as the one Professor Shaffer believes he
found in his Indianapolis law firm in the early 1960's, an environment that will
nurture in them the habits necessary to choose wisely when confronting moral
problems and mentors who will exhibit and cultivate practical wisdom? The
current state of the profession-reflected in the legal newspapers, the
sociological and empirical literature, and the anecdotal literature-suggests that
the answer is "no."'' The primary interest in money and the connected
increase in the number of billable hours expected of young lawyers appear to
leave little time or inclination for the discussion and practices necessary for the
nurturing of character. Worse, such developments may themselves reflect an
absence of character and practical wisdom among lawyers.'- 2 As Jeffrey
Stout suggests, our professions and their institutions could be a place for
cultivating virtue and other internal goods (as opposed to the currently
predominant external good of money),'53 but there is little to indicate growth
in that direction. It would be good to have more professionals and citizens who
have developed the skills of practical wisdom (another way of referring to
developed, educated moral character), but how we move toward building that
skill-in our families, our law firms and corporate law offices, and the varied
institutions throughout society and the profession-is far from clear.
V. CONCLUSION
I would suggest that the solution to the central problem of this Article
consists of a combination of some tentative rules, derived from the four
premises stated above, with a practical wisdom connected to the roles and
tasks of our profession (to the extent it can be developed). The first rule or
principle is that the client has a presumptive fight to know the law governing
his or her situation, understanding "law" in the widely defined contemporary
sense. The second rule or principle is that the lawyer has a presumptive moral
obligation to engage in a counseling conversation if there is reason to foresee
that the client may violate the law or a significant legal or moral norm. When
applying these rules, and in determining when and why the presumptions have
been overcome, the seven distinctions developed in this Article will be helpful.
In addition to that analytic assistance, however, lawyers working their way
through these problems ought to be aware that what is necessary to reach a
151. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993); Robert W. Gordon. Bargaining
with the Devil, 105 HARV. L. REv. 2041 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD D. KAttLENBERG. BROKEN CONTRACT
(1992)). For one empirical study suggesting that the models provided in the law office are often the wrong
ones, see Lawrence K. Hellman. The Effects of Law Office Work on the Formation of Law Students'
Professional Values, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1991).
152. I say "may" because the leaders in some firms might have felt compelled to follow the other
firms due to the constraints of market competition; some senior lawyers with practical wisdom may have
perceived no space in which to try to develop it in their juniors.
153. STOUT, supra note 149, at 266-92.
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solution is the exercise and development of their own practical wisdom. In
such deliberations, reliance on character-on implicit perception and
evaluation, on moral habit-is unavoidable. For this reason, in working on the
professional ethics of lawyering in the larger sense we-practitioners, teachers,
the profession-ought to (1) formulate a set of such tentative rules and
principles and (2) work to create a culture that will cultivate a professional
practical wisdom for applying them. The dualism here is an effort to suggest
the compatibility of a "rights"-oriented perspective, which views the primary
job of lawyers as providing clients with access to the law to which they have
something resembling a right, with a "virtue"- and "character"-oriented
approach to the professional life of the lawyer. We need the rules and
principles to protect clients who are often vulnerable or dependent in relation
to professionals, and to protect, in turn, third persons who often are vulnerable
in relation to the conduct of clients. We need practical wisdom because the
rules and principles simply will not be sufficient to deal with the moral
questions of lawyering.
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